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1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 
1.1. Organisation and timing 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU external action instruments1 for the period 
2014-2020, including this document, has been coordinated by a Task Force composed of 
services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams, appointed 
on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and studies 
mentioned in Section 2.2 and have liaised with other Commission services to ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force met with the drafting team in charge of 
this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 1 July, 14 July and 4 August 2011 for organisational and 
quality-check purposes. 
An Impact Assessment Steering Group, composed of the members of the Task Force and 
representatives of interested Directorates General and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011. It has met twice, on 13 and 26 July 2011. 
The review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board took place on 14 
September 2011. 
In line with article 27 of the Financial Regulation (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing rules of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment is the ex-ante 
evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 
1.2. Public consultation 
The Commission held a public consultation on future funding for EU external action between 
26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online questionnaire 
accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action after 2013?'. The 
consultation covered all instruments for external action, but many issues have been directly 
relevant to the DCI and are detailed below. 
A majority of the respondents (around 70%) confirmed that EU financial intervention 
provided a substantial added value in the main policy areas supported by EU financial 
instruments for external action2. Many respondents confirmed that the EU should make good 
use of its comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, 
its supranational nature and its role as a facilitator of coordination.  
Nearly all respondents (92%) supported a more differentiated approach, tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary country, in order to increase the impact of EU financial 
                                                 
1 The instruments are the following: 11th European Development Fund, Development Cooperation Instrument, 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument for Stability, 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Partnership 
Instrument and the instruments for the EU-Greenland Partnership. The Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the Civil Protection Mechanism are 
not part of this joint exercise. 
2 i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in stability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood countries, tackling global challenges, promoting EU and international standards and values, and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad. 
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instruments.  
Over two thirds of respondents believed that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account 
in its external action, and that the latter should be based on EU values and principles, and on 
development objectives of the partner countries. A number of contributions underscored that 
development cooperation should be based on a mutual partnership. 
A majority of respondents agreed that joint programming and co-financing with Member 
States could increase the impact and the coherence of EU external action, simplify the 
delivery of aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 
A vast majority of respondents supported stronger monitoring and evaluation systems in 
future instruments and in the implementation of projects/programmes. 
A majority of stakeholders supported increasing information and communication activities to 
enhance the visibility of EU external funding, in particular in the beneficiary countries; 
however EU visibility is regarded as being better served by effective policies, strategies and 
active presence in third countries, than by additional spending for communication. 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board 
Following the comments of the Impact Assessment Board meeting held on 14 September 
2011, the present Impact Assessment report was improved as followed: 
• An explanation of the legal and policy framework determining the content of the next 
development cooperation instrument is introduced (cf. section 2.1.2). 
• The explanation of problems identified and drivers is improved, with concrete cases 
and examples (cf. sections 2.3, 2.2 and 2.3). 
• The options are redefined to i) exclude the options already predetermined by the 
legal framework, ii) reinforce the "baseline-scenario" option and introduce the sub-
options considered for a possible change in the current development cooperation 
instrument and iii) introduce more details on how the options would work in practise 
(cf. section 4). 
• The comparison between pros and cons and assessment of the impacts are improved 
(cf. section 5 and 6). 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1. The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 
2.1.1. Problems requiring action 
The EU Treaty explicitly states that the Union shall define and pursue common policies and 
actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, 
in order to "foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty". 
Poverty remains a major problem in developing countries. Most of them are off-track towards 
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the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs")3 and they are not enjoying 
a sustainable development. While significant advances towards the MDGs have been made, 
there is still a long way to go in several areas, and strong commitment is required on the part 
of developing countries and donors to achieve the MDGs and eradicate poverty. The EU is 
committed to helping developing countries address these problems. In fact, the EU is a key 
actor helping developing countries to achieve the mentioned goals. The EU is currently the third 
largest donor worldwide, and together with its Member States counts for 50% of global Official Development Aid. Given 
this significant share in development financing, it is therefore necessary for the EU to 
continue to support developing countries' efforts to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty 
while attaining the objectives of sustainable development and gradual integration into the 
world economy4. 
The definition of the MDGs, progress towards targets and shortcomings are presented in 
Annex I. 
In addition, global challenges continue to be prominent and developing countries were hit 
hard by the succession of recent crises (financial and economic crises, food price rises, fuel 
price volatility) resulting in social and economic instability, forced migration, food insecurity 
and in general a state of increased vulnerability to external shocks. The continued 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources on which the poor depend (land, water, forests, 
etc…) and loss of biodiversity are other global challenges which need urgent attention if 
development is to become sustainable. The environment and natural resources are 
increasingly being recognized as vital for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction 
meaning that sustainable development requires good environmental management. Ecosystems 
and natural resources are a significant part of the national income and wealth of less 
developed economies, making them a strategic resource for development. Furthermore, 
climate change and energy issues, including access to energy, exacerbate an already fragile 
and difficult situation and risk to undoing some development achievements if they are not 
properly addressed. 
Against the above-mentioned background and as the world's population continues to grow, it 
is clear that more action is needed to increase developing countries' resilience to external 
challenges particularly in the case of the most disadvantaged countries. 
2.1.2. Scope of the present Development Cooperation Instrument ("DCI") 
The EU has the competence to carry out activities under its own common development 
policy; this does not prevent however EU Member States from exercising their own national 
development policy (cf. Article 4(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)). This is why coordination amongst EU and its Member State is particularly 
important in this policy area (see "How does the DCI work in practise?" below) in line with 
Article 210 TFEU. 
In the current 2007-2013 period, the DCI has a budget (reference amount) of €16.9 billion 
                                                 
3 The development objectives were defined by donors in the UN's Millennium Development Goals 
("MDGs") in 2000.  
4 Last year, the EU strongly reaffirmed its commitment to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs, 
including the reaffirmation of the collective target of devoting 0.7% of its GNI to ODA by 2015. Even 
beyond 2015 and even when some or all of the MDGs have been achieved, continued efforts will be 
needed to eliminate poverty. 
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representing 32% of Heading IV.  
The DCI was established with the primary and overarching objective of eradicating poverty in 
partner countries and regions in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit 
of the MDGs as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. The DCI is one of the EU's key instruments for providing 
development assistance to non-European countries alongside the European Development 
Fund ("EDF"), covering the African, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP") countries and the 
European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument ("ENPI"). All these instruments cover 
different geographic areas. The DCI is structured into three categories of programmes (see 
Annex II for the envelopes per programme). 
Bilateral and regional geographic programmes  
The DCI geographic programmes encompass cooperation with partner countries and regions 
selected on a geographical basis over five regions, namely: Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, 
the Middle East and South Africa. These five regions in the world still contained 70% of the 
world's people living on less than $1.25 per day5 and over 68% of the world's hungry people 
in 20106. The range of countries supported by DCI bilateral cooperation is highly diversified 
(see annex II). 
Cooperation with partner countries and regions encompasses a wide range of objectives, apart 
from supporting the MDGs and the promotion of democracy, good governance, the rule of 
law and human rights including gender equality. It fosters sustainable development, including 
political, economic, social and environmental aspects. It encourages the integration of the 
partner countries in the world economy, but also supports measures to preserve and improve 
the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources. It serves 
to strengthen the relations between the EU and partner countries and regions. The scope of 
possible areas of action is very comprehensive, though there are priorities defined per region. 
The geographic measures shall fulfil the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
established by OECD/DAC. 
Thematic programmes 
The instrument has five thematic programmes: i) investing in people, ii) the environment and 
the sustainable management of natural resources including energy (which includes climate 
change), iii) Non-State Actors (NSA) and Local Authorities, iv) food security, and v) 
migration and asylum. They complement the geographic programmes by covering specific 
areas which are of interest to a group of partner countries not determined by geography. They 
encompass not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the DCI, but also 
the ACP and EU neighbouring countries. 
Thematic programmes play a major role in supporting the external dimension of the EU's 
policies. They are critical for addressing challenges in countries where geographic assistance 
is, for whatever reason (security, fragility, political), not programmable. 
Sugar accompanying measures  
                                                 
5 2005 - WB 2008 report - last global data available. 
6 FAO – 2010. 
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The temporary Accompanying Measures for former Sugar Protocol countries within the DCI 
cover an appropriate period for adjustment of ACP countries following the 2006 EU Sugar 
Reform. No further funds are foreseen for the next financial perspectives.  
How does the DCI work in practise? 
As all the regulations for EU external action, the DCI is an enabling and not prescriptive 
instrument for EU development cooperation. This means that the DCI provides the general 
framework for EU intervention in third countries (general policy objectives, general 
principles, possible areas of intervention, conditions and decision-making mechanisms), but 
they do not define in detail the exact sector/area or type of intervention in each of the partner 
countries or regions concerned. Such level of detail is contained in the multiannual 
programming documents.  
Multiannual programming documents detail per country/region (geographic programmes) or 
per theme (thematic programmes), the sectors/areas of intervention, the type of assistance, the 
specific objectives, the expected results, the performance indicators, the amounts involved, 
etc. Before their adoption by the Commission, these documents are subject to a political 
dialogue with the relevant partner countries, civil society, donors (including EU Member 
States) and other stakeholders. This is in line with the principles of ownership and alignment 
to the development policies of partner countries and with division of labour and coordination 
amongst donors. After these documents have been adopted, the Commission may decide on 
the implementation of specific projects or programmes. The concrete projects or programmes 
that the EU intends to initiate in a given year are grouped per country, region or theme in 
action programmes adopted every year by the Commission. Both the multiannual 
programming documents and the annual action programmes are discussed with Members 
States (through the so-called "comitology" process). 
Generally, the revision of the DCI would mainly imply reviewing the enabling framework 
provided by this instrument in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU 
assistance. 
2.1.3. Areas for improvement linked to the scope of the DCI 
In 2008 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union 
confirms poverty eradication as one of the main objectives of EU external action and Article 
208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union places it as the primary objective 
of development policy. The Commission's Communication "A Budget for Europe 2020"7 has 
further confirmed the need for the European Union to have a specific development 
cooperation instrument during the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), with a 
proposed budget of €20.6 billion in 2011 prices. 
New challenges, together with the priorities set in the Europe 2020 Strategy, have prompted 
the Commission to make proposals to review and adapt the EU’s development policy given 
the urgent need to speed up progress towards the MDGs and to achieve inclusive and 
sustainable growth globally. Following the public consultation on the Green Paper published 
in November 2010, a Communication on EU development policy entitled "Increasing the 
Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change" will be adopted by the 
                                                 
7 COM(2011)500, adopted on 29 June 2011. 
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Commission in 2011. While this Communication will not propose a change in the overarching 
objective of the EU's development cooperation, which will remain the fight against poverty, 
an adaptation of EU development policy is proposed in order to meet the challenges of the 
coming decade, mainly:  
(i) the need to focus more on helping to strengthen governance and inclusive and sustainable 
growth in developing countries, while continuing to support basic social services. Those 
objectives should be translated into specific objectives of the DCI. 
(ii) to take into consideration the increasing differentiation of beneficiary countries: Apart 
from Least Developed Countries and Low Income Countries which get 50% of funds for 
bilateral cooperation, the DCI provides assistance to several middle income countries, 
including OECD members – Chile and Mexico. The list of beneficiaries includes emerging 
world powers: China, Brazil and India, as well as other G20 countries, namely South Africa 
and Indonesia. Some of the emerging powers have in recent years become significant donors 
themselves and are not aid dependent even though they still acknowledge high social 
disparities. The DCI may ensure sufficient and adequate differentiation amongst partner 
countries taking into account economic and social disparities amongst and inside partner 
countries and the development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance. 
(iii) to ensure a strong link between EU development assistance and partner countries' 
commitment to key reforms. It could take better into account the partner countries' progress 
on democratisation and respect for basic human rights. 
Finally, in a number of regions covered by different EU instruments, it has been difficult to 
support cross-regional or continent-wide initiatives because of the different nature, scope and 
objectives of the external assistance instruments. This applies to all regions but concerns in 
particular the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy ("JAES"), adopted in 2007. The 
expected mainstreaming of the support to the JAES in existing EU (EDF, ENPI and DCI) and 
Member State instruments has largely failed to materialise despite the recent reconfirmation 
of the JAES at the 2010 Africa-EU Summit. The Commission's Communication "A Budget 
for Europe 2020" specifically states that the DCI will support the JAES. 
2.2. Mid-term reviews and lessons learnt 
2.2.1. Results of the mid term review of the financial instruments for external actions 
A mid-term review has been conducted for each of the EU external action financial 
instruments for the period 2007-2013, including the DCI. It has been agreed that the general 
structure of these instruments are adapted to their purpose and that no major change should be 
introduced at that stage. Nevertheless, an enlargement of the scope of the Industrialised 
Countries Instrument (ICI) has been proposed in order to support programmes of mutual 
interest with developing countries that could not be funded under the DCI. For the new MFF 
the Commission proposes establishing a new instrument, the Partnership Instrument ("PI"), as 
a successor to the ICI. The proposed DCI together with the PI will enable the EU to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for developing countries that will take into account the development 
needs of the beneficiary countries, as well as wider EU interests and objectives. 
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2.2.2. Review of the lessons learnt 
In the preparation process of the new MFF, an internal review of the different reports 
(evaluations, audits, studies, mid-term reviews,) has been undertaken, looking at what worked 
and what did not work, and drawing lessons to be taken into account when designing the 
instruments for the next MFF (see Annex III for a more detailed account of lessons learnt and 
Annex IV for a list of reports reviewed). 
The evaluations, Court of Auditors reports, as well as mid-term reviews of the geographic 
programmes, show that progress towards several MDGs in the developing DCI countries was 
achieved with DCI support, as one of the most important financial instruments in the world 
supporting these objectives8. However, pursuant to the principle of ownership it is for the 
beneficiary governments to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies that were 
the driving force of these achievements. 
The DCI allows for a more strategic approach in planning and implementing EU aid, through 
a clear definition of sectors, objectives and expected results (set out in Strategy Papers, 
Multiannual Indicative Programmes and Annual Action Programmes as opposed to the 
previous variety of self-standing actions adopted individually) leading to an agreement with 
the beneficiary country. The DCI puts the beneficiary countries in the driving seat, and 
requires EU/donors to support the beneficiary's development strategy, policies and reforms. 
The new implementation modalities in the DCI, such as budget support and sector-wide 
approach, have allowed for a deeper level of cooperation with partner countries: there is a 
clear link between the level of policy dialogue with beneficiary countries and the modality of 
delivering assistance. Also, the new implementing modalities have rendered possible a more 
efficient division of labour by allowing co-financing amongst donors. New financial 
instruments foreseen in the DCI, such as blending mechanisms, could be used further where 
appropriate.9 
Thematic programmes provided the Commission some additional flexibility in dealing with 
specific challenges and also provided a useful instrument to complement the geographic 
programmes in areas such as: 
– investing in people allowing responses to emerging priorities in line with the Europe 
2020 Strategy, e.g. social inclusion of disabled persons and increasing the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled for AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
– addressing environment and sustainable management of natural resources including 
energy, allowing the EU to support key EU and international policy initiatives in the 
area of environment and development, including climate change, such as the Global 
Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) and the REDD+ piloting and Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT); 
– improving food security for the poorest and most vulnerable, this programme being 
recognised for the relevance of its interventions; 
                                                 
8 As mentioned before, the EU is the third largest donor worldwide, and together with its Member States counting for 50% of global ODA which is 
primarily delivered through DCI and EDF. Hence, it can be concluded that DCI supports the progress on MDG. 
9 Final report of the Working Group on the additionality of grants in the framework of blending 
mechanisms of 18 December 2009: http://www.dev-
practitioners.eu/fileadmin/Redaktion/GroupsFolders/Division_of_Labour/Loans_and_grants/WGBlending_FINAL_complete_report_181209.pdf. 
 EN 13   EN 
– supporting third countries in their efforts to ensure a better management of migratory 
flows : this programme enjoys significant flexibility and scope of action and allows 
for an increased integration of migration and asylum issues in development policies. 
Notwithstanding the above, a number of factors where identified as areas for improvement to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the DCI. 
In a globalised environment, different internal EU policies (such as climate change, 
environment, energy, water, justice and security, research, information society, immigration, 
fisheries, etc) are increasingly becoming part of the EU's external action, and in line with the 
EU 2020 agenda and the Lisbon Treaty a mutual reinforcement of internal and external 
actions is needed. The starting point is that integration, and not duplication, must be the key 
word. However, the existing fragmented architecture of the DCI with several thematic 
programmes was not adequate to allow the Commission to intervene swiftly on a sufficient 
scale even though this was critical to ensuring the effectiveness of internal EU policies. In 
some cases the thematic programmes were not sufficiently flexible to respond to recent global 
crises (e.g. the food price crisis, avian flu) or to international engagements taken at the highest 
political level (e.g. biodiversity and climate change). The thematic envelope therefore needs 
more flexibility in order to allow for a more predictable long-term engagement in response to 
global public goods and challenges, and to react to the various shocks affecting the poorest 
population. A global thematic envelop would enhance flexibility, timeliness, effectiveness, 
and sustainability of EU response to such crises. 
The food crisis  
To respond to the food crisis in the second half of the last decade, the Commission had to adopt a 
specific Regulation to tackle the food crisis in 2008 since the existing thematic programmes of the 
existing DCI were excessively pigeonholed to provide for a comprehensive coverage for such global 
challenge. 
The avian flu' crisis 
Avian Flu is a development issue as it disproportionately affects less developed countries, which 
have often limited resources to fight the disease and who suffer more from trade restrictions due to 
H5N1. The spread of avian flu is facilitated by traditional husbandry methods of small poultry 
breeders, whose livelihoods are particularly affected by poultry losses. It is also in developing 
countries that promiscuity with poultry, lower hygiene and education favour the contamination of 
humans. The risk of an evolution to pandemic forms of influenza (mutation/recombination), resulting 
in very high numbers of human illness and deaths, remains. Other human diseases are emerging of 
animal (zoonotic) origin and have also the potential for crises as they would spread rapidly across the 
world in a globalised context. So far the Commission has been contributing large amounts to the fight 
against avian flu in third countries, however through various separate external assistance instruments 
(DCI-Asia, ENPI, EDF) and different mechanisms: for example, through a Multi Donor Trust Fund 
with the World Bank (AHIF),the programme Highly Pathogenic and Emerging Disease (HPED) in 
Asia, a programme implemented by the African Union and through national envelopes in some 
countries in Africa, etc. Therefore EU response has been fragmented in geographical coverage, scope, 
and duration, and entailing constraints in coordination and reporting.  
Development cooperation still remains too fragmented and over-ambitious. The resources, if 
too thinly spread, do not always reach the required critical mass and do not allow for the 
necessary leverage to reach all the expected results. The recent increase of economic and 
social disparities amongst partner countries and the development of new objectives beyond 
pure development assistance calls for further differentiation amongst such countries. The 
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application of geographical differentiation becomes of key important to ensure that EU 
financing is concentrated in countries that need it the most (such as least developed countries, 
fragile states/countries in crisis, etc) thus increasing the impact of EU assistance. 
The review of lessons learnt also shows that, under the present DCI the specific provisions on 
fragile states / countries in post-crisis situation are not sufficient, underestimating the need to 
support political processes, strengthening the rule of law and governance. Addressing 
transition challenges requires a set of responses at country level, based on specific needs and 
related to a common strategy (holistic approach). The specific needs of countries in crisis, 
post-crisis and fragile situations were not sufficiently taken into account and the rigidity of the 
decision-making process for fund-allocation, programming and implementation made it 
difficult for the EU to swiftly respond to a rapidly evolving situation. 
The DCI had indicative allocations per region, without keeping any unallocated envelope, 
thus leaving limited possibility to mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs, like new 
political priorities and natural or man-made disasters. No un-programmed envelope was left to 
be used as a reserve. With very limited possibility to mobilise resources from outside the DCI 
instrument (except humanitarian assistance and IfS to respond to crises), the only way to 
ensure funding in response to unforeseen needs is to review and cut some country allocations. 
Finally, the current programming and implementation process foreseen for the DCI is too 
complex, does not permit the alignment of the EU programming cycle to those of its partners, 
and also does not sufficiently facilitate joint programming with Member States. Furthermore, 
it does not allow swift adaptation where so required, due to political or factual (e.g. crisis, 
fragility) requirements.  
Example of lack of flexibility of fund allocation and decision-making: The "Arab spring" 
Current situation in Yemen (as well as those of several other countries in the region) demonstrated the 
need for more flexibility in the implementation of cooperation in countries in crisis, as well as the need 
for having at disposal a reserve for unforeseen needs. Before the political crisis erupted in Yemen, the 
adopted annual action programme included concrete cooperation activities that were to be 
implemented through the government. Given the popular uprising and the repression by the 
authorities it has been later decided that EU cooperation would need to be refocused to other areas of 
intervention that would not include the government. In this specific case it is planned to focus on 
social welfare through a programme implemented by the World Bank. Nevertheless, given the long 
and cumbersome procedures to modify the action Programme the EU is missing the opportunity to act 
where it is most needed at this important moment in Yemen, as well as it risks loosing the funding due 
to annuality of the budget. Unallocated reserve and flexible procedures to adjust the multiannual 
programming would further increase the EU capacity to act immediately when an opportunity to 
strengthen the long term development process would arise, as it did not in Yemen. 
2.3. The underlying drivers of the problem 
On the basis of the above analysis and aforementioned reports, the following drivers have 
been identified as hindering the objectives or limiting the impact of the DCI: 
2.3.1. Driver 1 - DCI objectives are not fully aligned to the latest policy development 
trends 
The evolution of development policy, as reflected namely in the upcoming Commission 
Communication "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An agenda for change", 
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are not adequately reflected in the existing DCI. In particular, EU development policy should 
give sufficient recognition to inclusive and sustainable growth in partner countries, as 
identified in the EU 2020 strategy, while assisting in reducing partner countries' vulnerability 
and exposure to global shocks by addressing problems related to global public goods. 
2.3.2. Driver 2 - The DCI does not contain strong mechanisms to ensure significant 
differentiation amongst partner countries. 
The DCI covers a wide range of countries falling under the OECD/DAC definition of 
developing countries, from the Least Developed Countries to Upper Middle Income 
Countries. Each category has very different development needs, capacities, performance level 
and interests. Although the DCI refers to the differentiation principle and the need to give 
priority to the Least Developed Countries and Low-Income Countries, it provides no further 
guidance on how to do so. Such guidance would allow the EU to concentrate funds where the 
EU would have more impact and to apply an adequate policy/aid methodology mix depending 
on the needs, capacities and specific circumstances of each partner country. 
2.3.3. Driver 3 - Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not 
sufficiently embedded in the cooperation mechanisms of the DCI. 
Respect for good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law remain issues of 
concern, as achieving the MDGs is often hampered by the fact that in a number of countries 
the democratic institutions are still weak, or the power is in the hands of undemocratic or 
corrupt regimes. In some cases this was further exacerbated by a weak security situation in 
partner countries.  
2.3.4. Driver 4 - The current architecture of EU external action instruments does not 
provide the appropriate framework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a 
whole 
The geographically and thematically fragmented coverage of the existing instruments (EDF, 
ENPI, DCI) does not allow a African-wide response to challenges of continental scope, as 
required by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). It has proven difficult to mobilize ENPI 
contributions, despite the fact that North-African countries play a key role in the thematic 
partnerships. EDF-resources have been inadequate to cover innovative activities through pre-
established national and regional programming. Due to the lack of alternatives, intra-ACP 
funds have de facto become the main source of financing for the JAES'. However, they do not 
allow the Commission to cover all thematic priorities, they are insufficient to fund the broad 
range of Action Plan activities, and they do not cover Northern Africa. This failure to live-up 
to the joint Summit commitments has negatively affected relations with Africa, and has been 
detrimental to the EU's own interests to cooperate more effectively with African partners in 
tackling global challenges. 
2.3.5. Driver 5 - Thematic programmes are too fragmented to tackle global issues in a 
comprehensive and global manner 
The current structure of the DCI, with strictly separated thematic programmes, hampers the 
EU's capacity to react promptly and substantially to achieve the required impact, as was the 
case for instance during both the recent food crisis and the avian flu outbreak. Implementation 
is difficult since the scope of each thematic programme is often too narrow. 
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2.3.6. Driver 6 - The specificities of crisis, post-crisis and states in situation of fragility10 
are insufficiently taken into account in the current DCI 
Countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile states have specific long-term, development needs 
and requirements such as supporting state-building, peace processes, the rule of law, security 
sector reform and governance (short-term and immediate needs are covered by humanitarian 
aid and the Instrument for Stability). These are by nature fast-evolving situations requiring 
appropriate flexibility to respond to these countries' needs in a timely manner. The current 
lack of flexibility within the DCI significantly impacts EU intervention in those situations.  
Additional flexibility in programming for countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situations 
would allow for a quick adaptation of the EU response to the changing environment and 
needs, without going through lengthy and cumbersome programming review procedures. 
Some flexibility exists in the current DCI in this regard, as it is possible to finance ad hoc 
measures outside the programming documents in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. 
The application of this flexibility is limited, however, because of the lack of un-programmed 
envelopes of funds which could be used to respond to such unforeseen needs (see driver 7). 
2.3.7. Driver 7 - Insufficient flexibility with regards to fund-allocation 
The DCI does not contain any unallocated envelopes, thus leaving limited possibility to 
mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs, such as new political priorities and natural 
or man-made disasters. 
At the programming of the Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2011-2013, no un-
programmed envelope was left to be used as a reserve. The only way to ensure funding in 
response to unforeseen needs is to review and cut country allocations. However, taking into 
account that the DCI requires the EU to agree on the focal areas, objectives and allocations 
with the beneficiary countries, cutting country allocations after completion of the 
programming stage, proved to be politically difficult.  
Flexibility is also important for thematic programmes. During the last few years, several 
shocks have hit developing countries. The “food price crisis” required funding superior to the 
overall envelope devoted to thematic programmes under the DCI and led to a complex and 
lengthy process that was in contradiction to the urgency of the situation. 
2.3.8. Driver 8 - A complex and rigid programming process and stringent implementation 
rules 
The DCI rules on programming and implementation with regards to the adoption and 
amendment of decisions such as annual action programmes are rather rigid (e.g. extensive use 
of ex ante "comitology" process). Moreover, they systematically require the adoption of 
specific EU programming in the form of Country Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative 
Programmes per country/region. This may be difficult to conciliate with a number of 
objectives agreed by the Commission under international and European commitments on Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD's Paris Declaration, European Consensus for Development), requiring i) 
                                                 
10 The notion of crisis, as well as that of post-crisis and fragility are defined inter alia in article 168(2) of 
the Implementing Rules of the EU Financial Regulation and in the Commission Communication of 25 
October 2007 – Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments 
for sustainable development, stability and peace. 
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better division of labour and coordination amongst donors, which includes the possibility for 
joint programming between the EU and its Member States, and ii) alignment with 
development strategies/programmes elaborated by partner countries (e.g. Action Plans). Such 
programming modalities, not facilitated under the current DCI as it imposes specific 
programming rules and documents, are already practiced by donors including the EU in some 
countries (e.g. joint donors response strategies, defining division of labour among donors, EU 
Action Plan partially covering the national development strategy). By acting as one, the EU 
and its Member States would have more weight and leverage in policy dialogue with the 
partner countries and in the donor community.  
The role of the private sector and financial institutions within development strategies is not 
sufficiently encouraged to support public and private investments within partner countries as 
well as sustainable, inclusive and smart growth and the insertion of developing countries into 
the global economy. 
2.4. Legal base for EU action 
The specific legal bases for EU action in the development field are articles 208 to 210 of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the EU. In particular article 209, which establishes the need for 
the European Parliament and the Council to adopt measures necessary for the implementation 
of development cooperation policy, serves as the legal basis for an instrument to replace or 
amend the existing DCI. 
2.5. EU Value Added 
2.5.1. Global Challenges, Global Response & Global Leadership 
As the world's largest donor, the EU and Member States provide more than half (56%) of 
global aid to developing countries. The EU provides aid to the poorest people on the planet in 
more than 150 countries worldwide and is committed to achieving the MDGs on time by the 
end of 2015. The European Commission's official development aid alone11 represents 20% of 
total EU aid. In view of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities 
– security, smart, inclusive and sustainable growth and job creation, climate change, access to 
energy, resource efficiency, including the protection of biodiversity, safe management of 
chemicals and waste, health and pandemics, education and migration - will be achieved in 
isolation from the wider world. 
The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on behalf 
of and with Member States, giving enhanced credibility in the countries where it works. It is 
best placed to take on the role of global leader on behalf of its citizens, for instance in its 
contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. 
Another example for the EU's leading role on the international scene is its effort to combat 
climate change. In order to help other parts of the world to step up their efforts to combat 
climate change, the Commission intends to increase the proportion of climate related 
expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with contribution from different policies.12 
EU Heads of State have also agreed 'stepping up the EU contributions to averting global 
                                                 
11 Including EDF. 
12 COM (500) 2011. 
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biodiversity loss. In particular the Commission and member states will contribute their fair 
share to international efforts to significantly increase resources for global biodiversity, and 
will improve the effectiveness of EU funding for global biodiversity'13. Preserving and 
enhancing biodiversity and ecosystem services will contribute to poverty alleviation and boost 
the green economy. Coherence with the Europe 2020 strategy should be sought as far as its 
smart growth priority is concerned, promoting support to S&T, innovation and information 
and communication technologies (ICT) capacities as catalysts for socio-economic 
development. 
2.5.2. The critical mass of the EU 
With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the 
critical mass to respond to global challenges, such as poverty reduction and climate change. 
The action of individual Member States can be limited and fragmented, with projects which 
can be too small to make a sustainable difference in the field. 
This critical mass also puts the EU in a better position to conduct policy dialogue with partner 
governments. In a recent Green Paper consultation carried out to find out views from 
stakeholders on our development policy, all those who responded agreed on the role that the 
EU played in supporting good governance (including the participation of civil society), the 
rule of law, security, human rights and gender equality. The responses also showed that the 
people believe that the EU has a comparative advantage in the areas of energy, infrastructure, 
including ICT, agriculture and aid for trade. Similarly, in the UK's Department for 
International Development's recent Multilateral Aid Review, EU work in fragile states was 
commended. 
Thanks to the large scale of the EU, it can deliver help to the poor in some of the world's most 
remote areas, where most of the Member States have no strategic interest and their presence is 
limited. 
2.5.3. The EU is best placed to coordinate 
The EU has a network of international agreements all over the world, not matched by 
individual Member States, which gives them influence in almost all fields of international 
relations. The EU plays a multi-faceted role in development: as an implementing agent of EU 
aid and as an EU coordinator and policy-maker in the development field, as an economic and 
trade partner, through security policy and political dialogue, as well as through other EU 
sector policies – such as migration and asylum, climate, information and communication 
technologies, environment or energy. The EU can do more than other international 
organisations, because of its holistic approach to development and external relations, in 
addition to instruments for the promotion of democracy, and mechanisms to respond to a 
crisis. This horizontal approach, especially in areas like trade, where the EU can negotiate 
trade agreements on behalf of the entire EU, puts the EU in a better position than Member 
States to make the most of the development budget. 
The EU also has a long standing reputation and role as a promoter of inclusiveness and 
multilateralism. Its efforts in pursuing a comprehensive international climate regime in the 
context of the international UN climate negotiations and through bilateral dialogues, as well 
                                                 
13 COM (2011) 244 final. 
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as its leadership in multilateral environment agreements, have reflected positively on the EU 
external identity. The EU has also constructed arguably the most sophisticated set of policies, 
incentives and standard to facilitate its economy's transition to low carbon and is working to 
achieve resource efficiency by 2020. These experiences and lessons should be made available 
to developing partners to advance their integration in global markets. 
Division of labour through the EU is a crucial component of its added value. With its network 
of international agreements, the EU is a natural coordinator, and can influence almost all 
fields of international relations, which individual Member States, acting within common 
policies and strategies, cannot do alone. 
2.5.4. Acting as one makes financial sense 
Acting as one, EU can have greater impact and more leverage in policy dialogue and donor 
cooperation. At a time of budgetary restrictions, when several Member States are compelled 
to exit entire sectors and countries, the EU is able to play an active role in promoting 
democracy, peace, solidarity, stability, prosperity and poverty reduction worldwide. In this 
context, it makes more sense than ever from a purely economic perspective to invest money at 
EU level where a real difference can be made. Certain aid effectiveness reforms, especially in 
terms of division of labour, could add up to potential savings of between 3 and 6 billion a 
year, according to a recent independent study14. 
Working with the EU is also more cost effective. Commission administrative costs – 
estimated at 5.4% on the basis of 2009 data - are lower than the average administrative costs 
of the principal bilateral aid donors. Furthermore, thanks to development cooperation, some 
issues can be tackled in advance and save money. By investing in developing countries, 
migration and asylum, climate change, ecosystem degradation, food security, piracy, security, 
sexual violence and many other issues are addressed. It is often far cheaper to eliminate the 
root causes of insecurity and poverty than deal with its symptoms further down the line. 
2.5.5. Greater accountability 
Every euro spent on development is scrutinised by the European Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors, and also by every Member State. In addition, the European Commission is one of 
the most transparent aid donors in the world. Transparency is in itself an important tool for 
ensuring effectiveness and value for money. This has been recognised by the UK organisation 
"Publish what you Fund" which ranked the European Commission in 4th position (out of 30) 
in it is first Aid Transparency Assessment of donors in February 2011.  
                                                 
14 See The Benefits of a European Approach, by HTSPE. 
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3. OBJECTIVES 
3.1. Policy framework and objectives 
3.1.1. Policy framework 
The 'European Consensus'15 adopted in 2005 together with the Code of Conduct16 provides 
the general framework, orientations and focus to steer the implementation of EU cooperation 
with partner countries and regions. The communication on EU development policy ('Agenda 
for change') is expected to be adopted by the Commission during the autumn 2011, whereby 
the revised policy objectives of EU development policy will be further specified. This policy 
framework, together with the EU Treaty, determines the objectives of EU development 
policy, applicable also to the successor of the DCI. 
3.1.2. Objectives 
3.1.2.1. Global objectives of the development policy under the instrument 
The overarching objective of the EU development policy should be reducing and, in the long 
term, eradicating poverty in partner countries and regions, with a special emphasis on: 
– promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance; 
– supporting inclusive and sustainable growth-oriented development, including inter 
alia environmental and climate smart sustainability. 
On that basis, the EU will continue supporting the MDGs, which provides well-established 
performance indicators, while ensuring consistency with the upcoming Commission 
Communication on the EU development policy "Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: An agenda for change". 
3.1.2.2. Objectives related to the review of the instrument itself 
• Objective 1- Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development 
policy (cf. driver 1) 
In addition to the overarching objective of the current DCI, the revised instrument should be 
able to properly project the EU's internal policies into its external dimension by elevating 
sustainable and inclusive growth to the level of driver for achieving the primary objective of 
poverty alleviation, in order to increase its response capacity to global challenges and the 
protection of public goods that would properly take into account EU internal policy 
objectives. 
                                                 
15 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting with the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on EU development policy of 
20 December 2005. 
16 The Code of Conduct was agreed in 2007 (COM/2007/72) and presents operational principles for EU 
donors regarding complementarity in development cooperation. Their aim is to enhance effectiveness 
by improving overall development results and impact for poverty reduction and reducing the transaction 
costs, through a division of labour between donors. For instance, it was agreed each donor will work in 
3 sectors only, plus General Budget Support if applicable and support to civil society organisations. 
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• Objective 2 - Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation 
amongst partner countries (cf. driver 2) 
The revised instrument should allow a more differentiated approach amongst partner countries 
in order to respond to the specific situation of each country, taking into account their needs, 
capacities and performance, and the potential impact of EU aid.  
• Objective 3 - Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms 
(cf. driver 3) 
The revised instrument should foresee an increased degree of linkage between the fund 
allocation/programming and respect for EU values, namely good governance, democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law, providing incentives to concerned partner countries to 
improve governance. The revised instrument should have the necessary flexibility to engage 
and support such processes in the concerned partner countries.  
• Objective 4 – Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(JAES) (cf. driver 4) 
The revised instrument should provide an adequate legal basis and coverage for the 
implementation of the JAES.  
• Objective 5 - Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic 
programmes (cf. driver 5) 
The added value of a thematic programme is its ability to project EU core values (gender, 
social inclusion, etc) and to allow the EU to intervene more efficiently on global public goods 
such as research, biodiversity and global crises (e.g. avian flu) where the action of the 
Commission should also benefit countries without bilateral co-operation. The flexibility of the 
instrument should be sufficient to mobilise significant resources to address these issues 
whenever needed (e.g. food price crises, climate change). 
• Objective 6 - Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and 
fragile situation (cf. driver 6) 
The revised instrument should ensure the necessary flexibility in terms of strategies, 
programming and implementation procedures in countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile 
situations to allow for the quick adaptation of the EU response to their changing environment. 
• Objective 7 - Increase flexibility of fund allocation (cf. driver 7) 
The allocation of funds between regions/countries/themes should be flexible enough to allow 
a swift re-attribution of funds in case of unexpected needs requiring a rapid reaction (e.g. 
crisis/post-crisis/fragile states, new political priorities, the need to apply the differentiation 
and mutual accountability principles as well as the conditionality for good governance, etc).  
• Objective 8 - Simplify programming and increase flexibility of implementation, in 
consistency with the principles of aid effectiveness (cf. driver 8) 
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The programming and decision-making process should be simplified and flexible, making it 
possible for the EU to make use of joint programming and alignment with the programming 
cycle of partner countries.  
Finally, the new instrument should provide the legal basis to allow the EU to use/increase 
innovative instruments allowing the involvement of the private sector and financial 
institutions in the implementation of EU assistance in partner countries. 
3.2. Consistency with external action priorities 
In the context of the principles, objectives and the new institutional framework set by the 
Lisbon Treaty development cooperation must be mutually coherent with other initiatives for 
external action. The revised instrument will be an integral part of the overall architecture of 
external action financial instruments which will be organised around four main chapters: a 
policy-based chapter aiming primarily at cooperation with partner countries within and 
outside the budget; working on cross-cutting priorities and values; humanitarian assistance 
and civil protection; and crisis management. 
Moreover for every country, development cooperation will be complementary to the new 
“Partnership Instrument”. Interaction between the DCI, EDF and the ENPI will be particularly 
strong under the DCI thematic envelopes which will cover and/or complement actions in the 
geographical zones covered by these respective instruments in the field of: support to civil 
society and local authorites, climate change, energy, food security, human development and 
migration. 
Interaction with the Trade policy, in particular GSP/GSP plus and Everything But Arms 
schemes, but also trade agreements will remain particularly important with Aid for Trade / 
Trade Related Assistance actions funded under DCI, both at bilateral and regional level.  
The programming principles and approaches of the DCI shall be adjusted to better respond to 
the dynamic developmental challenges of the 21st century, such as scarcity of natural 
resources, ecosystem degradation, population pressures and climate change. The 
omnipresence of these phenomena and the risks they pose to development progress will 
undermine efforts to reduce poverty and reach the MDGs if they are not comprehensively 
incorporated into the development cooperation programmes and approaches.17 
3.3. Consistency with other EU policies 
As laid out under chapter 2.2.2 the integration of different internal EU policies is a key 
priority. The main arguments are: i) coherence of our external action; ii) aid effectiveness, 
notably the commitment to reduce the number of actors and programmes; and iii) maximising 
synergies between policy objectives.  
In order to ensure the coherence and consistency of the EU's overall policy, there are 
important arguments in favour of continuing the current approach of financing such aspects of 
                                                 
17 The onus for more robust and climate resilient development planning rests on the national governments. However, the EU, as the strongest proponent of 
international and inclusive climate action, can promote policies in this respect and ensure its own country programming incorporates climate action. Similarly, 
support for natural capital assessments to show the value of supposedly free ecosystem services and for measuring the health effects of pollution to show the 
costs of inaction will help our partners pay more attention to the environmental base for sustainable development which in turn should lead to cooperation on 
environmental protection. 
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internal EU policies mainly under Heading 4 of the EU budget through the geographical 
external programmes (i.e. mainstreaming) or through thematic programmes (environment, 
climate change, energy).  
By mainstreaming internal EU policies through geographical programmes, the external 
dimensions of internal policies can be included in the agreements concluded with third 
countries and become part of the policy dialogue with them. These aspects are at the centre of 
EU country and regional programming in areas such as standards setting, infrastructure 
networks, including ICT, trade, business frameworks, energy, education and research, justice 
and home affairs activities etc. The MFF Communication18 specifically suggests to commit 
the EU to mainstreaming climate change and biodiversity throughout the budget.19 
Mainstreaming ensures coherence, fosters ownership and ultimately enhances effectiveness 
and impact.  
While the "mainstreaming approach" was already followed for the currentMFF, it can be 
further improved. At the level of country programming, internal policy priorities should be 
taken into account more explicitly in the process of designing geographic programmes, while 
also respecting the country ownership principle and alignment on development strategies. For 
example Ministries in partner countries responsible for environment and climate are often left 
out of discussions on development strategies and aid allocation even though these issues have 
cross-cutting implications for all sectors as well as being important development issues in 
their own right. 
Furthermore, this highlights the EU commitment to advancing on Policy Coherence for 
Development ("PCD"). This requires that the objectives of development cooperation be 
considered in all EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries.20 The PCD 
strategy was adopted to overcome potential negative impacts of internal policies on 
developing partners but needs to become a mechanism for the mutual reinforcement and 
integration of policies. It requires that the design of every EU sectoral policy avoid 
incoherence with the EU development policy.  
Finally, aid alone cannot bring the necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out 
of poverty. Private sector development through the development of trade and investment is 
essential. Aid in general should facilitate reform to foster services to the population but also 
support private sector development and trade integration. Economic activity is affected by the 
institutional, legal and political conditions prevalent in third countries, including development 
ones, such as the existence of functioning market institutions and a sound economic 
governance. The EU actively encourages its trading partners to establish competition regimes 
and this objective also includes developing countries. Along with other policy objectives such 
                                                 
18 COM (500) 2011. 
19 The Lisbon Treaty made combating climate change at international level a specific EU objective. The EU is determined to deliver on its international climate 
finance commitments. Already today, a proportion of the EU budget is related to climate mainstreaming and thus contributes to Europe's transition to a low 
carbon and climate resilient society. The Commission intends to increase the proportion to at least 20%, with contribution from different policies, including 
from the external instruments. Equally EU Heads of State have to step up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss and improve the effectiveness 
of such EU funding, commitments that will be further defined in the preparations for the next Conference of the Parties of the Biodiversity Convention in 2012 
which is due to agree on mobilising resources to implement the global biodiversity strategy adopted in Nagoya. 
20 May 2005 Council Conclusions confirm the EU is committed to the implementation of the objectives 
contained in the Commission's Communication on PCD dealing with the areas of trade, environment, 
climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social dimension of globalisation, employment and 
decent work, migration, research and innovation, information society, transport and energy. 
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as a well-functioning public administration and an independent judiciary safeguarding the 
enforceability of contracts, an effective competition policy creates a business environment 
facilitating economic growth in developing countries (set of transparent rules, competition 
authorities as arbiters on anti-competitive behaviour, reduced policy risk and stimulated 
foreign investments due to clear rules of the game). 
3.4. Geographical/thematic coverage 
The legal base should allow for all policy areas and activities of external action to be 
promoted in third countries with the appropriate mix of sectors and modalities determined 
specifically per country, on the basis of an analysis of needs, capacities, interests, 
commitments and potential EU impact. 
Geographic cooperation will focus on poverty reduction in the context of inclusive and 
sustainable development but also on promoting the principles of good governance, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including protection of minorities and other vulnerable 
groups and will cover the developing countries outside those covered by the ENPI, EDF and 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). In the current DCI, the European Parliament requested at 
least 20% of funding to be spent on health and education. The draft Communication on EU 
development policy ('Agenda for Change') indicates that a similar funding target for social 
and human development will be maintained by the Commission. 
The thematic envelope under DCI will focus on (i) the support for civil society and local 
authorities and (ii) global public goods and challenges notably environment especially 
biodiversity, climate change, energy, water, human and social development (especially 
education, health, social protection, employment and gender equality), food security and 
migration and will seek in particular to mainstream EU policies into development cooperation 
while increasing flexibility across themes to promote a "holistic approach". In order to live up 
to its international commitments under the UNFCCC and UNCBD namely to increase 
substantially the mobilisation of financial resources for climate change and for global 
biodiversity by 2020, the EU should aim to spend no less than 25% of the programme for 
"Global Public Goods" on climate change and environmental objectives. The thematic 
envelope encompasses not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the 
DCI, but also the ACP and EU neighbouring countries. Furthermore, thematic programmes 
should be in coherence with the overall approach to partner countries and regions. 
The instrument will also support the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS 
4.1. Option 1:"No change": cooperation with the countries concerned remains 
strictly in the framework of the existing DCI Regulation 
DCI would be extended for the 2014-2020 period with no further amendments. Each of the 
identified objectives is assessed against this backdrop. 
4.1.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
The overarching principle of eradicating poverty in the context of sustainable development 
and consolidating and supporting democracy, good governance, human rights, equal 
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opportunities and the rule of law would continue. No reference to the objectives related to the 
evolved EU development policy as defined in the Communication "Agenda for Change" 
would be included, in particular to sufficiently address global challenges.  
Not changing the objectives would ensure the familiar focus with which stakeholders are 
already acquainted and comfortable. Nevertheless, this would not allow the EU to sufficiently 
tackle the newly arising EU and global priorities and commitments in the area of development 
aid. 
4.1.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2) 
The current DCI includes differentiation as a general principle (art. 3.2). This principle is also 
reflected in the programming, as the multiannual indicative allocations are based on needs and 
performance of the partner country (art. 18).  
While the basic principles for differentiation would continue to play a role in the DCI, status 
quo would not reinforce it by sending a clearer message of intention, nor would it be coupled 
with a clear, strong mechanism for its implementation. In addition, many developing countries 
wish to move beyond pure development assistance and are thus becoming less interested in 
DCI funding. 
4.1.3. Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 
The current DCI includes these principles as part of the objectives of the instrument. 
Nevertheless, status quo would mean that programming and allocation would be carried out 
without having a clear mechanism for supporting and rewarding progress towards better 
governance and the reinforcement of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  
4.1.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
The financing of the Pan-African strategy would need to be funded through three different 
instruments: the European Development Fund for Sub-Saharan countries, the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument for North Africa and the DCI for South Africa. Until now this 
proved to be extremely difficult and keeping the same structure would endanger a coherent 
and comprehensive implementation of the commitments in the Joint Strategy. 
4.1.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)  
Under this option the five thematic programmes would remain. The problem of implementing 
programmes with elements from the different thematic programmes would remain, causing 
EU assistance to be fragmented, less coherent and less efficient 
4.1.6. Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
In case of no change of the DCI, EU would not be able to take into account the full extent of 
the changes taking place in countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation beyond initial 
planning. EU would be severely limited to adapt and react to any developments that would 
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take place in such vulnerable countries during the time that the DCI would be in force. 
4.1.7. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 
The current situation would be maintained, meaning that the share of un-programmed funds 
would be extremely limited. Funding outside programmable funds would remain possible 
only through the adoption of special measures in the event of unforeseen and duly justified 
needs related to natural disasters, civil strife or crisis. In many cases the lack of reserves 
implies that indicative amounts need to be reduced to some countries and regions, bring about 
important political implications (example – the Arab Spring and the need for identifying 
additional funds for this region at the expense of some other regions).  
4.1.8. Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
The current complex and stringent programming procedure, which systematically requires the 
adoption of EU-specific Country Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes in 
all cases and following the EU's programming cycle would remain. The instrument would not 
foresee the possibility to move away from the EU specific programming documents, 
continuing the duplication of development strategy formulation with the member states. 
While not preventing other modalities, the status quo would rely on the usual and tested 
modes of implementation of the EU assistance. Not introducing or promoting new modalities 
could be perceived as simpler for the implementation of EU aid. However, it would not take 
account of the need to seek more innovative approaches in the programming (e.g. joint 
programming with the Member States) and in the implementation stage (e.g. twinning), which 
could ensure higher added value for the delivered aid. 
4.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 
4.2.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
• Sub-option 1A – Align the objectives of the instrument with the EU Treaties 
The objectives would reflect the latest evolution of EU legislation, in particular the Lisbon 
Treaty –arts 21(2) TUE and 208(1) TFEU. While this would put the instrument in line with 
the wide objectives of the Lisbon Treaty, it would lack the necessary focus that an instrument 
for development needs. This would also imply that the priorities could change with each 
additional interpretation of the Treaty or seem as ‘cast in stone’. Neither would ensure the 
required mix of flexibility and predictability. 
• Sub-option 1B – Align the objectives of the instrument with the latest trends of 
development policy 
The objectives would be updated to reflect the latest evolution of EU legislation and policy, in 
particular with regards to inclusive and sustainable development which would become a 
general objective of the instrument, in particular the Lisbon Treaty –arts 21(2) TUE and 
208(1) TFEU but also i) the Europe 2020 strategy; ii) the Communication "A Budget for 
Europe 2020" and iii) the future Communication "Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: an Agenda for Change"). This option would ensure a transparent interpretation of the 
objectives of the EU development policy and signal a clear framework for their identification 
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and formulation of potential changes. 
4.2.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2) 
• Sub-option 2A - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data on their development level 
This option would enable establishing a clear cut and criteria that would determine on which 
countries EU development assistance would be focused. Nevertheless, in many cases 
statistical data do not paint the entire picture of the situation in a country. Indeed, many 
countries’ statistics are done on different premises and are thus not fully comparable. In 
addition many wealthier countries face challenges and constraints similar to those of the 
poorest and least developed countries.  
• Sub-option 2B - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
The criteria for a differentiated EU approach would be based on the criteria identified in the 
Communication "An agenda for change". Under this option, the Commission may decide not 
to allocate funds to a number of countries. These criteria are: 
(a) Country needs 
(b) Capacities  
(c) Country commitments and performance 
(d) Potential EU impact on policy reform and on leverage of EU Aid 
This type of focus should enable to concentrate funds in those countries where they are 
needed most, yet still provide a framework for development aid around specific cooperation 
areas and modalities that are necessary in all developing countries. 
In principle, grant-based aid should not feature as the primary vehicle in cooperation with 
more advanced developing countries already on sustained growth paths and/or able to 
generate enough of their own resources. However, they should benefit from grant-based aid 
under thematic and/or regional programmes, in particular under the new investment facilities. 
Grant funds should be secured so that activities such as the transfer of know-how under the 
new blending schemes can be implemented in the more advanced developing countries.  
The above mentioned criteria would also be applied to define the level of allocations from 
which each country would benefit under bilateral cooperation. This includes inter alia 
favouring countries with governments which take a strong lead and which assume 
responsibility for the development of their country21, apply sound policies and are accountable 
to their people through the democratic process. The policy mix would thus allow for a greater 
country-based approach, looking at needs, capacities, interests and commitments. 
Foreseeing an envelope of funds for performance-based incentive distribution would allow the 
necessary flexibility, improve value for money and strengthen the role of policy dialogue. 
                                                 
21 In particular in areas of public finance management including the income side, public administration 
reform and institutional development, strengthening their social policies and improving framework for 
private sector development. 
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4.2.3. Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 
• Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 
This sub-option would imply that any country that would no follow these principles would be 
completely excluded from EU development assistance. This could be assessed together with 
relevant international organisations and institutions (e.g. UN). While this would send a clear 
signal on the importance the EU attaches to these issues, it could prove counterproductive 
when trying to engage with some of these countries, with the final price being paid by the 
populations.  
• Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Recognising that aid alone cannot bring the necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull 
countries out of poverty, EU cooperation would further integrate such development drivers as 
the rule of law, good governance, democracy and human rights. There would be some degree 
of linkage between fund allocation and the respect of universal values, namely good 
governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, yet this would not be the only 
parameter in defining the available funds. Insufficient progress would not prevent the EU 
from continuing cooperation, but in such cases strategy would be adapted (e.g. cooperating 
exclusively with the civil society, limiting cooperation to the social sectors). 
4.2.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
• Sub-Option 4A: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES 
Ensuring a complete coverage of the JAES through one single instrument would add to the 
coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as well as add to their overall efficiency. 
Nevertheless, an important problem of potential duplication with the EDF would arise. In 
addition the financial reality of DCI is such that it would not be possible to finance the 
complete JAES in a comprehensive manner only through DCI.  
• Sub-Option 4B: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover 
only continental activities of the JAES 
An amount would be allocated under the new DCI to only support the implementation of the 
continental activities of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its successive Action Plans, as well 
as other relevant African-wide initiatives. This does not prevent supporting the 
implementation of the Strategy through other components of the DCI or through other 
instruments such as the EDF or the European Neighbourhood Instrument. Indeed, the Pan-
African Programme would be complementary to activities financed through these other 
instruments, in order to ensure a comprehensive and efficient implementation of JAES 
commitments. 
4.2.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5) 
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• Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one 
This sub-option would offer significant flexibility in the implementation as it would cover all 
types of thematic activities under one umbrella. This would prevent fragmentation of EU 
assistance in cases where the programme would contain elements of different thematic 
priorities (e.g. the case of avian flu and food crisis in 2008). The danger of this approach 
would be to loose visibility and effectiveness of some important elements of the current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non-State Actors and local authorities programme.  
• Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 
This sub-option, like the previous one, would reduce the fragmentation of the thematic 
programmes and increase the flexibility of the DCI in responding to unforeseen events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes covering: (i) civil society organisations22 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 
4.2.6. Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)  
• Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one  
This sub-option would offer significant flexibility in the implementation as it would cover all 
types of thematic activities under one umbrella. This would prevent fragmentation of EU 
assistance in cases where the programme would contain elements of different thematic 
priorities (e.g. the case of avian flu and food crisis in 2008). The danger of this approach 
would be to loose visibility and effectiveness of some important elements of the current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non-State Actors and local authorities programme.  
• Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 
This sub-option, like the previous one, would reduce the fragmentation of the thematic 
programmes and increase the flexibility of the DCI in responding to unforeseen events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes covering: (i) civil society organisations23 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 
4.2.7. Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
• Sub-Option 6A: Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation 
                                                 
22 Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 
23 Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 
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This sub-option would imply that for countries that would be characterised as in crisis, post-
crisis or in fragile situation, no annual programming would be required, and all proposed 
activities would be proposed outside of any existing programming document. While this 
would allow important flexibility and swift reaction in the implementation phase, it would not 
provide the necessary level of accountability and quality control. 
• Sub-Option 6B: Increased flexibility in programming and in implementation 
procedures 
Provisions allowing a more flexible and rapid (re)programming for fragile states, states in 
crisis and post-crisis situations through quicker programming procedures, tailor made ad-hoc 
reviews as well as specific implementation procedures would be introduced in the regulation. 
Such provisions would ensure the EU to act swiftly and with sufficient flexibility in cases 
such as the Arab Spring, while not compromising on the accountability and quality, as the 
procedures would keep the regular comitology and democratic scrutiny as the rule, even if 
introducing a type of ex post control.  
4.2.8. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 
• Sub-Option 7A: Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level 
A reserve of un-programmed funds would be foreseen at the level of each country strategy 
and indicative programme. This would increase the capacity to act in cases of unforeseen 
events and opportunities (positive conditionality) in these countries. There could be potential 
difficulties in cases of major national or regional disasters (the 2004 tsunami in South East 
Asia) or global crisis (food crisis in 2008) where the availability of funds could prove as too 
limited for the scale of the disaster. In addition, the reserve would be set to each individual 
country, potentially exhausting it too early in some, while not benefiting from it in other 
countries.  
• Sub-Option 7B – Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve 
at the level of the instrument 
A reserve of un-programmed funds would be foreseen at the level of the instrument in order 
to allow a swift re-allocation of funds in case of unexpected needs and opportunities requiring 
a rapid reaction. While this sub-option would clearly increase the flexibility at the level of the 
instrument, the decision to leave certain amount of funds unallocated would consequently 
somewhat reduce predictability as less of the total DCI envelope would be long term 
programmed. 
4.2.9. Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
• Sub-Option 8A: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming 
and implementation rules by introducing obligatory Joint Programming and 
Alignment 
Joint Programming with Member States and alignment with the beneficiary countries would 
significantly improve the coherence and effectiveness of total EU development assistance, 
putting in practice the principles of aid effectiveness. Making these elements obligatory would 
ensure that these principles are fully respected in all EU development cooperation assistance. 
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At the same time, making these arrangements obligatory for the delivery of EU development 
cooperation aid could significantly complicate the programming and implementation process, 
in particular for cases where it would be difficult to find a common language between the EU 
and various Member States, where it would not be effective to align to the national 
development plan or where quick re-programming decisions would need to be taken. In this 
cases we would even risk failing to implement planned cooperation.  
• Sub-Option 8B: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 
To simplify the decision-making process and improve aid effectiveness, the DCI would 
integrate two elements which would facilitate a better Division of Labour between the EU and 
its Member States as well as joint programming namely: 
– simplification of programming by not requiring Country Strategy Papers when other 
valid strategic documents exist (e.g. EU documents, joint programmes agreed with 
EU Member States, partner country's own development strategy); 
– alignment of EU assistance with the development cycle of partner countries. 
By introducing provisions of the aid effectiveness agenda, the coherence and effectiveness of 
the total EU development aid could significantly be improved.  
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 
This chapter analyses the global impact of the options and sub-options in terms of their likely 
economic, social and environmental impacts as well as the achievement of policy objectives 
of the instrument and the likely impact on efficiency and management. The different options 
have been qualitatively assessed based on the Commission Services' qualitative appreciations 
of the likely impact. 
5.1. Option 1: No Change 
In general, this option would not address any of the other aforementioned objectives and 
consequently would not address any of the lessons learnt and areas for improvements 
mentioned in Section 2. For instance, EU assistance is currently thinly spread throughout 
almost all countries eligible for ODA assistance leading, in part, to limited result and impact, 
and high fragmentation of development assistance. With no additional changes, the DCI 
would not live up to the evolved EU development policy, as defined in the Communication 
"Agenda for Change", nor would it be fit to sufficiently address global challenges. It would 
increase management risks as the EU would continue to try to do "everything everywhere". It 
would continue to promote predictability sometimes at the cost of flexibility, and in particular, 
it would be difficult to change and adapt policy to current political priorities. Introducing 
more flexibility for all countries, especially when dealing with states in situation of crises or 
fragility, and facing unforeseen needs require amendments to the DCI.  
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5.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 
5.2.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
In addition to the overarching principle of eradicating poverty and consolidating and 
supporting democracy, good governance, human rights, equal opportunities and the rule of 
law, a reference to global public goods and resources would allow inclusive and 
environmentally sustainable growth as a primary objective for development. In this manner, 
development policy could properly project the EU's internal policies and values into its 
external dimension, in terms of volume of aid as well as in geographical coverage in order to 
increase its response capacity to global challenges and the protection of public goods. 
• Sub-option 1A – Align the objectives of the instrument with the EU Treaties 
• Sub-option 1B – Align the objectives of the instrument with the latest trends of 
development policy 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Incorporate latest evolution of EU legislation and policy, 
in particular with regards to inclusive and sustainable 
development, but as well regarding the Lisbon Treaty and 
the EU 2020 Strategy 
Clearer interpretation of the objectives of EU 
development policy  
Clear framework for the identification and formulation of 
potential changes of the objectives of EU development 
policy 
With time, changes in development policy might no longer be 
reflected in the DCI Objectives and will need to be adapted 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Pertinent framework for development aid in numerous 
countries 
 
Does not address the identified lessons learnt and areas of 
improvement  
Increase management risks as the EU would continue to try 
to do "everything everywhere" 
Continue to promote predictability sometimes at the cost of 
flexibility which is necessary for tackling crisis, unforeseen 
needs and new global challenges 
Not in line with current political development priorities 
(Agenda for Change) 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The objectives would reflect the latest evolution of EU 
legislation, in particular the Lisbon Treaty –arts 21(2) 
TUE and 208(1) TFEU 
Does not sufficiently take into account the specificities of the 
development cooperation instruments 
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5.2.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2)  
Differentiation would have a clear positive impact both for the beneficiary countries in need 
(focus on poverty), EU Policy Coherence (aid assistance to emerging countries in particular in 
view of European economic difficulties) and on human resource management in Headquarters 
and Delegations (high administrative costs due to fragmentation of aid). Focusing EU aid on a 
limited number of countries will allow the EU to reach a critical mass to achieve change, 
expected results and impact, leading to a reduction of poverty, an improvement of access to 
and the quality of social services and an improvement – where relevant – of the environmental 
sustainability of development. It will give the EU sufficient leverage in policy dialogue with 
partner countries. 
While differentiation (and consequent concentration of EU aid) may be welcomed by 
countries that would benefit from it, it may cause some political uneasiness in countries that 
would no longer benefit from bilateral grant-based assistance as mentioned in the description 
of this option. Also, one can claim the EU will lose leverage in relations with the emerging 
countries and other wealthy countries. However, cooperation with such countries should be 
based more on partnership than development, which may be particularly welcomed by these 
countries which want to be treated by the EU as partners on an equal footing rather than 
recipients of EU aid. Furthermore, these countries would still benefit from regional and 
thematic programmes. The transition from grants to other aid modalities could be gradual in 
order to smoothen the political impact of the new orientations. Non-grant based instruments, 
such as blending of grant and loans, may still be used with such countries and would also 
prove to be particularly adapted in such cases. 
Finally, concentration of aid shall allow for the improvement of the quality of management 
and further strengthening of the EU comparative advantage in a number of areas. 
• Sub-option 2A - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Clear cut criteria that determine on which countries we 
would focus EU development assistance 
Using solely statistical data does not reflect the entire picture 
of the situation in a country 
• Sub-option 2B - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Concentrate funds in those countries where they are most 
in need: focus on poorest countries and away from 
emerging powers  
Adapt aid modalities to countries (grant aid not primary 
modality for more advanced developing countries)  
Allows for funds for performance-based incentive 
distribution  
Concentration of aid can lead to strengthen EU 
comparative advantage and leverage in a number of areas 
Impact on bilateral relations with some countries who would 
no longer benefit from development aid, particularly for 
developing countries with large population of poor 
Reduced global EU reach  
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5.2.3. Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3)  
Promoting good governance shall lead to an improvement for EU cooperation results and 
impact in economic, social and environmental areas. It shall promote good performance, 
while not neglecting countries in crisis or post-crisis situations. 
On the other hand, the use of such mechanism would be perceived as a political tool by which 
the EU may loose its neutrality, which is often an important asset for EU cooperation. The 
risks of partially losing credibility as a neutral actor in some countries would be largely 
compensated by the improved coherence of EU policy with EU values, which needs to be 
promoted in the world as underlined by the Lisbon Treaty. It also would enhance the overall 
credibility and legitimacy of the EU development policy vis-à-vis EU external partners as 
well as European citizens. 
In the case of countries with deteriorating human rights situation, directing aid through civil 
society, non state actors and international organisations unavoidably leads to an increase of 
management costs, which in such specific cases is justified. 
• Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Clear message on the paramount importance of respect for 
human rights, rule of law and promotion of good 
governance 
Restrictive and possibly static approach: this might be 
counterproductive when engaging countries showing progress 
(countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situation) 
• Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Fund allocation and continued cooperation would reflect 
the importance of those values  
Does not neglect countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile 
situation 
Improved coherence of EU policy with EU values 
Enhance overall credibility and legitimacy of the EU 
development policy vis-à-vis EU external partners as well 
as European citizens 
Development cooperation, on its own, cannot bring the 
necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out of 
poverty 
Development cooperation might be perceived as a political 
tool: loss of credibility as a neutral actor 
5.2.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
Establishing a Pan African programme within the DCI will have a positive economic, social 
and environmental impact, both for African beneficiaries and for the EU. It will increase the 
policy impact and the operational results in the Joint Strategy's successive Action Plans, in 
particular in the relevant thematic partnerships such as Trade and Regional Integration, 
Climate Change and Environment, Energy, Migration, Mobility and Employment, but also 
Democratic Governance, MDGs, and Science and Information and Communication 
Technologies. The mechanism is politically feasible, based on the relevant conclusions of the 
2007 and 2010 Africa-EU Summits. It will contribute to greater policy coherence at the EU 
level and will lead to better coordination and complementarity of action between EU 
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institutions, Member States and IFIs. Finally, it will have a positive impact on management 
and implementation issues, as it will reduce overlap and competition with other instruments. 
• Sub-Option 4A: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as 
well as add to their overall efficiency 
Risk of duplication with other instruments such as the EDF or 
the ENI 
New area with possible impact on fund allocation for other 
DCI priorities 
• Sub-Option 4B: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover 
only continental activities of the JAES 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as 
well as add to their overall efficiency 
Complex follow up to ensure good complementarity between 
EDF, ENI and DCI 
5.2.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5) 
Designing flexible mechanisms able to respond quickly and substantially will be of crucial 
importance for the EU to have sufficient impact in its response to these challenges and in 
support of the poorest segment of the population. The sub-options would allow reducing the 
fragmentation of thematic programmes and increasing their flexibility in responding to 
unforeseen events. Aid cooperation needs to be dynamic: recent events and scientific evidence 
call for maximum response flexibility: the role of civil society continues to grow; while some 
countries evolve out of poverty others continue to struggle with their recurrent fragile state; 
climate change is resulting in unpredictable weather patterns as shown by the increasing 
number of extreme weather events; biodiversity is declining, affecting the natural adaptation 
capacity of eco-systems; the world population continues to grow putting heavy pressure on 
scarce natural resources already deficient in certain parts of the world, which results in 
humanitarian crises; there are waves of migration resulting from multiple causes; food prices 
continue to be the source of instability; risks of pandemics are real, etc. Designing flexible 
mechanisms capable of responding quickly will be of crucial importance in order for the EU 
to have sufficient impact in its response to these challenges and in support of the poorest 
segment of the population. Reducing the number of and adjusting the areas (concentration on 
a reduced number of areas) will lead to further a focus on clear value added interventions. In 
this context, placing higher emphasis on public knowledge goods is a pragmatic way to 
enhance cost-effectiveness. It will also allow focusing on political priorities, increasing 
responsiveness, enhancing subsidiarity of thematic programmes to geographic programmes, 
building in synergies within programmes and ensuring more coherent support to sectoral 
policies at global/transnational level. 
• Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and possibly reduced fragmentation Potential loss of visibility for stakeholders 
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• Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and possibly reduced fragmentation 
Two comprehensive thematic programmes allows the 
coverage of current and future challenges  
Higher flexibility will strengthen reduced fragmentation: 
although enhanced flexibility will allow for swift 
responses to new global challenges, the programme for 
global public goods and challenges will be 
complementary to geographic programmes and target 
mainly at addressing climate change, environment, 
energy, human development, food security, and migration 
while ensuring coherence with the poverty reduction 
objective. 
Potential loss of visibility for stakeholders 
 
5.2.6. Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
Increased Flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation would allow for a 
quicker adaptation of the EU response and an improved EU capacity to ensure an appropriate 
response to the specific needs of countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situation through 
increased flexibility as regards programming, re-programming and implementation. 
• Sub-Option 6A: Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Swift reaction to crisis, post crisis and fragile situations Accountability and control 
• Sub-Option 6B: Increased flexibility in programming and in implementation 
procedures 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Balanced approach between a swifter reaction to crisis, 
post crisis and fragile situations and accountability and 
control 
Procedure slightly longer than with full flexibility 
 
5.2.7. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 
Measures to increase flexibility of fund allocation such as a reserve of un-programmed funds 
would facilitate swift response to unexpected, unplanned needs, whether of a political nature 
or due to man-made or natural disasters. As a result the beneficiary countries would receive 
assistance in a timely manner tackling the needs at hand. It would also allow for the provision 
of financial incentives taking into account the performance and commitment of partner 
countries. 
However, care should be taken that these responses to unexpected events are without 
detriment to long term issues such as climate change and environment (and the political 
commitments of the Commission and the European Council in this regard). 
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• Sub-Option 7A: Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and capacity to address unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 
Use of positive conditionality for well performing 
countries 
Funds might be "trapped" in a country while other country, 
regions could efficiently use the funds 
Unprogrammed funds might decrease predictability of funds 
• Sub-Option 7B – Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve 
at the level of the instrument 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and capacity to tackle unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 
Use of incentive based-allocations for well performing 
countries 
A larger overall reserve can enable improved handling of 
major crisis and unforeseen needs 
Management rules to be established to avoid possible loss of 
funding at end of programming cycle 
Risk of competition for accessing funds in the reserve  
 
 
 
5.2.8. Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
Simplifying the programming process would significantly improve EU added value though an 
improved division of labour and a faster response. Where appropriate, no extensive analytical 
work would be required for partner countries that have their own coherent development 
policy/strategy (national development plan, PRSP or similar). A simplification of the multi-
annual programming cycle would facilitate joint programming with EU Member States and 
possibly with like-minded donors. Alignment with the partner country's programming cycle 
would also become possible and would be in line with the ownership and aid effectiveness 
principles. For the beneficiary country, the advantages would be both economic (lower 
economic costs, efficient resources used with donors cooperation) and social (donors will 
focus better on a limited number of sectors). Simplification in programming would have a 
positive balance in terms of human resources and time consumption. Joint programming could 
however lead to complex situations for coordination with Member States both at local and 
capital level.  
Finally, the introduction of innovative instrument such as blending and Private Public 
Partnerships, which could attract private sector and financial institutions, may increase the 
critical mass of EU assistance to address larger-scale and innovative projects. Such 
instruments, usually applied through regional or thematic instruments, could also benefit those 
DCI partner countries which, as a result of the application of the differentiation principle, 
would no longer receive bilateral grant-based EU assistance.  
Finally, this sub-option also permits to better take into account the specificities of countries in 
crisis, post crisis and fragile situation. 
• Sub-Option 8A: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming 
and implementation rules by introducing obligatory Joint Programming and 
Alignment 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 EN 38   EN 
Compulsory nature would ensure the principles of aid 
effectiveness: improved coherence and effectiveness of 
total EU development assistance 
Reciprocity on Joint Programming necessary from Member 
States providing bilateral aid 
Complex and lengthy programming and implementation 
process  
Negotiation process with Members States for each partner 
country required  
Risk on timely implementation of assistance 
• Sub-Option 8B: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Gradual and enabling approach by simplifying 
programming and aligning EU assistance to the 
development cycle of the partner countries 
 
Full Joint Programming with Members States will require 
political agreement and time  
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS  
6.1. Weighing-up of positive and negative impacts per option  
Objective Option 1 Option 2 
Sub-Option A 
Option 2 
Sub-Option B 
1 Align the objectives 
of the DCI with the 
new trends in EU 
development policy 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
EU Treaty  
(+) 
Latest trends of development 
policy 
(++) 
2 Establish strong 
mechanisms to ensure 
significant 
differentiation 
amongst partner 
countries 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Based on statistical data 
(-) 
Based on a combination of 
objective quantitative and 
qualitative data 
(++) 
3 Strengthen the 
inclusion of good 
governance, 
democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of 
law 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Key parameter of fund allocation 
(--) 
Driver of fund allocation 
(++) 
4 Ensure support for 
the implementation of 
the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Cover all activities 
(+) 
 
Cover continental activities 
(++) 
 
5 Reduce the 
fragmentation of and 
enhance the focus of 
thematic programmes 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
One thematic programme 
(+) 
 
Two thematic programmes 
(++) 
 
6 Better address the 
specific needs of 
countries in crisis, 
post crisis and fragile 
situation 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Complete flexibility 
(+) 
Increased flexibility 
(++) 
 EN 39   EN 
7 Flexibility of fund 
allocation 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Un-programmed reserve at 
country level  
(+) 
Un-programmed reserve at 
instrument level 
(+++) 
8 Simplified 
programming and 
flexibility in 
implementation, in 
consistency with the 
principles of aid 
effectiveness 
No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) 
Obligatory Joint Programming  
(--) 
Simplification and flexibility 
to enable Joint Programming 
(++) 
6.2. Preferred option 
On the basis of the analysis of underlying drivers of the problems, the policy options 
developed and their impacts, all sub-options B of Option 2 appear to be the optimal 
choice:  
• The DCI Objectives need to be aligned with current trend in development policy 
(sub-option 1B). 
• On differentiation, using a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
will enable to reduce the scope of countries and improve the means to concentrate on 
EU added value aid assistance in a comprehensive manner (sub-option 2B) 
• Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law can best be taken 
into account with sub-option 3B.  
• Sub-option 4B, the Pan-African programme focused on continental activities is the 
response for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy given the 
complexity of procedures and to avoid potential duplication of funds 
• Regarding fragmentation of aid assistance, sub-option 5B would enable an increased 
flexibility within the thematic envelopes (in particular Global Public Goods) for a 
better EU response to political priorities and better complementarity to geographic 
programmes for an increased leverage, while leaving the possibility to particularly 
address civil society organisations and local authorities.  
• Situations of fragility, crisis and post-crisis will be better addressed with sub-option 
6B: a set of specific rules and objectives, mainly on flexible (re-)programming while 
keeping an effective level of accountability and control. 
• The reserve at the instrument level in sub-option 7B enables the EU to better cope 
with unforeseen needs and to promote mutual accountability with partner countries 
(incentive based-allocations) and avoids "trapping" funds in a specific country. 
• On simplification and flexibility of programming and implementation, sub-option 
8B would provide the elements to simplify procedures and provide the required 
flexibility for allowing Joint Programming and Alignment, which would enable a 
better Division of Labour with Member States (and possible like-minded donors) and 
improved complementarity with partner countries. Such enhanced aid effectiveness 
may be achieved through the use of innovative instruments. 
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7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives 
The DCI is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for EU 
intervention. The exact actions are defined through multiannual programming and annual 
action programmes detailing the activities to be carried out by the EU, including the 
objectives pursued by the actions in question and the expected results. Specific indicators are 
fixed at that moment, having in mind the particularities of the action in question. 
Internationally agreed targets and indicators on the MDGs24 and climate change are already 
known. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and reporting rules for all relevant EU policy 
instruments need to be established. The disaggregation of indicators will be important in 
monitoring the achievement of equitable outcomes for the most vulnerable groups in society 
for social inclusion. 
For the objective of reducing and, in the long term, eradicating poverty in partner countries 
and regions, the MDG indicators for Goal 1 may be used, along with other indicators 
Internationally agreed by all donors: 
• Target 1a: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day: 
(i.e. proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day; poverty gap ratio and share of 
poorest quintile in national consumption). 
• Target 1c: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger (i.e. 
prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age and proportion of 
population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption). 
The EU has committed itself to mainstreaming action on climate25 and biodiversity and for 
this to be meaningful it needs to be accompanied by an obligation to identify relevant 
programmes so that the EU is able to set out clearly how much of its spending relates to these 
global challenges. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and reporting rules need to be established. 
Expenditure that promotes climate action or energy efficiency as well as the protection and 
sustainable management of biodiversity and ecosystems, will be tracked based on the 
established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’). 
7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements 
The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects and programmes in various ways, including wherever possible through field visits. 
                                                 
24 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm  
25 Regarding instruments under the EU budget, in order to reach the Europe 2020 objectives and to help 
other parts of the world to step up their efforts to combat climate change, the Commission stated in the 
June 2011 Communication on “A Budget for Europe 2020” that it intends to increase the proportion of 
climate related expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with contribution from different 
policies, subject to impact assessment evidence. 
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Monitoring provides valuable information on progress; it helps managers to identify actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions 
through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the 
improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform 
future policies and actions. The tools all use the internationally-recognised OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 
Firstly, at the project level, the Headquarters-managed Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly structured, standardised methodology, independent ROM experts attribute grades 
which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and give recommendations on 
how to improve effectiveness. 
Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegation in charge of the project, 
deliver a more detailed, in depth analysis and help project managers to improve ongoing 
interventions and prepare future ones. External, independent experts with thematic and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the analysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 
The Commission also conducts strategic evaluations of its policies, from programming and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education 
etc), in a country or region, or of a specific instrument. These evaluations are an important 
input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments and projects. These 
evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is 
included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 
A study on legal instruments and lessons learnt from the evaluations managed by the joint 
evaluation unit of the external relations services was undertaken. The findings of this study 
provided some valuable insight into the functioning of the current DCI and have been 
reflected in the preparation of its successor. It is possible to do a similar exercise sufficiently 
in time for the preparation of the MFF post-2020.  
The current system of monitoring and evaluation covering various levels can generate ample 
information. However, it should be kept in mind that the instrument covers a wide variety of 
countries and situations. Indicators which are regularly used to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of aid delivery and financial management could support the measuring of the 
objectives related to the review of the instrument itself. 
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Annex I 
Detailed analysis of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
In the year 2000 the UN General Assembly agreed on eight specific development goals to be 
achieved by 2015. These MDG are: 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women 
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development 
The UN MDG progress report of 7 July 2011 acknowledges significant progress made towards 
some MDGs, namely fighting poverty and hunger, ensuring universal education, child and 
maternal health as well as combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases due to the continued 
economic growth of some developing countries, targeted interventions in critical areas and 
increased funding from many sources. The report alerts however that in several areas there is still 
a long way to go, and the achievement of the MDGs is at risk. This concerns in particular access 
to quality education, educating and empowering women and girls, promoting sustainable 
development and protecting the most vulnerable groups.  
Despite significant setbacks after the 2008-9 economic downturn and food and energy crisis, 
developing countries are on track to reach and even exceed the poverty reduction target of 23% as 
the global poverty rate is expected to fall to 15% by 2015. Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, 
South Africa and Latin America covered by the DCI together still contain around 70%26 of all 
poor people worldwide. Despite the reduction in poverty, the number and proportion of hungry 
people stagnated at 16% worldwide, with South Asia scoring the highest rate of undernourished 
children under 5 (43%), almost double in the rate Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to rising food prices 
and economic crisis, it will be difficult to meet the hunger reduction target in many regions of the 
world. 
In general, the UN MDG progress report acknowledges that “progress tends to bypass those who 
are lowest on the economic ladder or are otherwise disadvantaged because of sex, disability or 
ethnicity”. In most of the developing countries, economic growth has not benefited all parts of 
society and was indeed achieved at the cost of rising social disparities. Low labour and 
production costs remain the key factor in developing countries' investment policies. The 
inequality GINI index27 has not dramatically changed for most DCI countries in the period 2006-
2009, presenting slight improvement in 16 countries and deterioration in 11 countries. 
There are huge disparities between the urban and rural areas, the latter disadvantaged as regards 
access to public services such as health and education, sanitation and access to safe drinking 
water. On the other hand, despite a decrease of the proportion of the urban population in 
developing countries living in slums to 32,7% in 2010, due to a global increase in the number of 
                                                 
26 The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, UN; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in an Era of 
Global Uncertainty: Asia Pacific Regional Report, 2009/2010, ESCAP. 
27 World Data Bank. 
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urban dwellers the global number of urban residents living in slum conditions continues to grow 
(828 m in 2010 as compared to 767 m in 2000 and 657 m in 1990). Improving their living 
conditions remains a tremendous challenge and will require redoubled efforts. 
While MDGs are a useful instrument to measure progress in development, they do not provide 
the full picture and set objectives only for a part of the most affected populations. Notably they 
do not measure progress on key aspects of development such as good governance and respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and institutional development. While measuring progress in access 
to education or health, they do not measure progress in quality. Relying only on statistical data 
does not give the complete picture of the development problems of a country: looking at the 
baseline values, the dynamics of change and the underlying reasons for slow or lack of progress 
has proved to be of key importance for the success of EU development cooperation. 
Moreover, insufficient attention to strengthening the capacity to do and use research has been 
shown to be associated with low development performance in meeting basic needs in health, 
food, and the protection of the environment and the public goods and services it provides and on 
which poor people depend disproportionately. 
The report of the 7 July 2011 is based on better statistical information than in the past but there is 
still a long way to go for many countries to develop a stable statistical system capable of 
providing reliable statistical information for MDG measurement purposes. 
- MDG1 – End poverty and hunger 
In 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of poor people (51%), followed by South Asia 
(39%), South-East Asia and Central Asia (19%) and East Asia (16%). Asia, Central Asia, the 
Middle East, South Africa and Latin America together still regroup around 70% of all poor 
people worldwide. The prevalence of vulnerable employment (usually without formal working 
arrangements, without adequate social protection and bad working conditions) is linked to the 
poverty situation. 
In 2009, nearly 25% of children in the developing world were underweight, with the poorest 
children most affected. The proportion of undernourished children under 5 is highest in South 
Asia (43%), almost double the rate in Sub-Saharan Africa (22%), which is followed by South-
East Asia (18%). Such a high rate of malnourished children is due to a combination of factors: 
shortage of quality food, poor feeding practices and inadequate sanitation. Trends in South East 
Asia, East Asia and Latin America indicate they are likely to meet the hunger reduction target, 
the former due to the performance of China, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
- MDG2 - Universal Education 
Many of the poorest countries have made significant progress in education, but progress has 
slowed since 2004, dimming the prospect of reaching that MDG. The quality of education in 
developing countries is often poor, which is not reflected in the MDGs but what undermines 
people's chances for employment and social advancement. According to a UN report, nearly 90% 
of all illiterate people are concentrated in 2 regions – South Asia (65 m) and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(47 m). 
- MDG3 - Gender equality 
While girls are gaining ground as regards access to education, the progress is unequal with South 
Asia, West Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa lagging behind. The progress in girls' access to 
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education does not however translate into improvement in women's access to full and productive 
employment. 
In at least half of all regions, following significant job losses in 2008-9, the growth of 
employment in 2010 was lower for women than for men.  
- MDG4 – Child health 
Child mortality has been diminished due to immunisation, improved access to health services and 
the level of education of women. Nevertheless the level of mortality of children under five is still 
unacceptably high, the highest in South Asia (69 per 1000) after Sub-Saharan Africa although 
both regions have made the greatest progress. Most affected are poor rural areas. In number of 
DCI countries with the highest children mortality rates (exceeding 40 per 1000 live births), 
namely Bangladesh, Laos and Nepal, these rates have been reduced by more than half. 
Afghanistan remains the only country outside Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 100 deaths per 
1000 births. UN estimates the MDG targets can still be achieved, provided that substantial and 
accelerated action is taken to eliminate the leading killers of children. 
- MDG5 - Maternal health 
Major progress has been made in North Africa and Asia, but South Asia still remains the region 
with the highest number of maternal deaths (280) after Sub-Saharan Africa (640), which is linked 
with the lowest ration of deliveries attended by skilled health personnel, access to health services 
during pregnancy, adolescent fertility and access to family planning aid, and generally weak 
public health services.  
- MDG6 - Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases 
Good progress has been made on MDG6. Targeted interventions allowed for a 20% cut in deaths 
from malaria since 2000, the largest in Africa. As far as HIV/AIDS is concerned, thanks to the 
expansion of major programmes which increased the number of people receiving anti-retroviral 
therapy, a 19% decline in deaths was recorded from 2004 to 2009 and the number of new 
infections in 2009 was 21% lower than in the peak year of 1997. Finally, the number of deaths 
due to tuberculosis was brought down by one third during the 1990-2009 period. 
- MDG 7 - Environmental sustainability 
The progress towards environmental sustainability is mixed. Despite the world economic crisis, 
global greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow, with the most rapid growth taking place in 
East Asia and South Asia even though the industrialised countries continue to be the biggest 
greenhouse gases producers per capita. Furthermore, the depletion of global marine resources 
continues. Climate change, while affecting all regions, is a particular threat for the Arctic, small 
islands and big deltas in Asia and all of Africa, since the populations there have the least capacity 
to adapt. The rate of deforestation is slowing down, though it remains alarmingly high. Net gains 
in forest cover have been recorded in Asia, due to China, while the deforestation of South 
America and Africa continues. Between 12% and 55% of selected vertebrate, invertebrate and 
plant groups are threatened with extinction. Some 20% of tropical coral reefs have already been 
lost and an additional 50% are at risk. Only 0.7% of the oceans are protected and the depletion of 
global marine resources continues. The 2011 UN MDG report states there is a need to take more 
decisive steps to protect the ecosystems which support economic growth, sustain life on earth and 
are of particular importance to the livelihood of the poor. The UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012, “Rio + 20” will provide a good opportunity to tackle these challenges. 
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Inter alia it will seek to reach agreement on promoting green growth and encouraging resource 
efficiency which are essential means of avoiding future food and energy shocks.  
- MDG 8 – Global partnership for development 
As far as MDG8 is concerned, Information and Communication Technology (ICTs) penetration 
had enjoyed a breathtaking growth in developing countries since the adoption of the MDGs in 
2000; there were at that time 740 million mobile subscribers and nearly 400 million internet users 
worldwide; we are now at 5 billion mobile users and around 2 billion internet users worldwide, 
and developing countries had by far the highest penetration growth rates.  
A first wave of policy reforms triggering private investments are at the origin of such growth, 
making those technologies more accessible and affordable. In just 10 years, the situation has 
dramatically changed, and the growing access to the internet and the near ubiquity of mobile 
phones have opened radically new ways to anticipate, support and leapfrog development 
objectives. In this context, further support is needed to expand access to ICTs and as well as to 
expand the availability of ICT infrastructures and services, as these are an essential prerequisite 
in these countries for the provision of services such as health, education or banking, to name just 
a few sectors. 
For more detailed information on these trends, see the 2011 Development Goals Report published 
by the UN, on the following website: 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/2011%20Stat%20Annex.pdf 
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Annex II 
1. Financial breakdown of the DCI 
Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) 16.9 
Of which: 
Geographic programmes: 10.057 
Latin America 2.690 
Asia 5.187 
Central Asia 0.719 
Middle East 0.481 
South Africa 0.980 
Thematic programmes28: 5.596 
Investing in people 1.060 
Environment and sustainable management of natural resources, 
including energy 0.804 
Non-State actors and local authorities in development 1.639 
Food security 1.709 
Migration and asylum 0.384 
ACP Sugar Protocol countries: 1.244 
2. Countries eligible under the DCI geographic programmes 
Latin America 
1. Argentina 
2. Bolivia 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. Colombia 
6. Costa Rica 
7. Cuba 
8. Ecuador 
9. El Salvador 
10. Guatemala 
11. Honduras 
12. Mexico 
13. Nicaragua 
14. Panama 
15. Paraguay 
16. Peru 
17. Uruguay 
                                                 
28 An indicative amount of € 465 million is earmarked to finance activities benefiting ENPI countries (art. 38 
of DCI). 
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18. Venezuela 
Asia 
19. Afghanistan 
20. Bangladesh 
21. Bhutan 
22. Cambodia 
23. China 
24. India 
25. Indonesia 
26. Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
27. Laos 
28. Malaysia 
29. Maldives 
30. Mongolia 
31. Myanmar/Burma 
32. Nepal 
33. Pakistan 
34. Philippines 
35. Sri Lanka 
36. Thailand 
37. Viet Nam 
Central Asia 
38. Kazakhstan 
39. Kyrgyz Republic 
40. Tajikistan 
41. Turkmenistan 
42. Uzbekistan 
Middle East 
43. Iran 
44. Iraq 
45. Oman 
46. Saudi Arabia 
47. Yemen 
South Africa 
48. South Africa 
2. OECD-DAC List of Official Development Recipients 
(Effective for reporting on 2009 and 2010 flows) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/40/43540882.pdf 
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Annex III 
Review of lessons learnt 
A) The success of the DCI instrument: 
The geographical programmes 
Geographical programmes supported the pursuit of national development objectives and sector 
strategies. The progress towards the MDGs in several sectors in developing countries was 
achieved with EU support (for example, in Asia, child and maternal mortality in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh and Philippines, access to education in Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Burma/Myanmar and Indonesia, improved food security in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar). In several countries EU assistance helped to lay solid 
foundations for key sector policies, namely health in Tajikistan, Vietnam and Philippines. 
Under the DCI, there was an incentive to take a strategic approach in implementation. This is 
because it is expected that an agreement will be reached with the beneficiary government on the 
focal areas of cooperation as defined in the Strategy Paper and the Multiannual Indicative 
Programme. 
Another advantage is that the DCI regulation puts the beneficiary countries in the driving seat, 
and requires EU/donors to support the beneficiary's development strategy, policies and reforms. 
This has led to a gradual change in the way programming documents and actions are prepared. In 
the past, the choice of sectors and the preparation of actions had often been done by the 
Commission. 
The DCI combined with new implementation modalities, such as Budget Support and sector-wide 
approaches, have allowed for a higher level of cooperation with partner countries: there is a clear 
link between the level of policy dialogue with beneficiary countries and the modality of 
delivering assistance. In countries where Sector Budget Support is provided, the policy dialogue 
has been upgraded and this has allowed the Commission to work more strategically. 
The DCI regulation allows the Commission to accept funds from EU Member States and other 
donors for management, and to entrust EU Member States or other donors with implementation 
of EU assistance. This allows the Commission to receive funds, especially from smaller donors 
that do not have the capacity to manage themselves and this can enhance the profile of the EU as 
a donor. This also allows the Commission to be less dependant on International Organisations 
and to draw more on the experience of EU Member States. 
The thematic programmes 
The thematic programmes provided the Commission with additional flexibility in dealing with 
specific problems and were a useful means to complement the geographic programmes.  
(1) Investing in people 
The objective of this programme is to assist EU partner countries where they most need support 
in achieving the MDGs in the following human and social development fields: (i) health; (ii) 
education; (iii) gender equality and women empowerment; (iv) social inclusion, employment and 
decent work; (v) children and youth; (vi) cultural diversity. The array of delivery methods and 
potential activities ensure that the targeted groups are reached by the variety of objectives, either 
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through competitive global/regional calls for proposals or by co-funding international initiatives. 
This programme has allowed responses to emerging priorities in line with the 2020 Strategy, e.g. 
social inclusion of disabled persons. The evaluations of the global initiatives co-funded under the 
programme, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as the 
Education for All Fast Track Initiative, have returned positive results in terms of the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled, the increasing number of children enrolled in schools, and 
gender parity. The programme mainly channels its support through International Organisations in 
global partnerships and through NSA, whose role in policy dialogue, implementation monitoring, 
and governance improvements in those specific areas is crucial. Moreover, they reach vulnerable 
populations in varied political and development aid contexts. The programme even 'fills the gap' 
when no bilateral programming is available, as was the case for Cuba in 2009 and 2010. 
(2) ENRTP 
This programme contributes to achieving the MDGs and favours innovative approaches and 
support to policy-oriented initiatives at regional and global level, on environmental and climate 
change aspect of development, including through close cooperation with the UN system. This 
allows the EU to support key EU and international policy initiatives in the area of environment 
and development (including climate change). The programme encompasses complex climate 
change-environment-energy linkages and offers the Commission an opportunity to make a 
difference at the international level in cooperation with developing countries. It has been flexible 
in promoting new initiatives such as the Global Climate change Alliance (GCCA), the Global 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) and Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT). EU ability to involve partner countries in ambitious efforts to 
tackle global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation 
underlines the interdependencies between the EU and its key partners. The programme has also 
allowed the EU to promote its own environmental and climate change policies externally. This is 
particularly important in the context of Europe 2020, since without real efforts by key strategic 
partners, the EU's own strategies for economic recovery and innovation-led green and inclusive 
growth will be less effective. In addition, to achieve the objectives, increased support forthereof, 
on research and innovation capacity building is required. 
The EU has already irreversibly pegged its economic future to low carbon growth by unilaterally 
adopting the most ambitious emissions reduction target in the world. Accordingly, the EU2020 
Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth includes climate change and renewable 
energy targets among its five headline objectives. The EU has confidence in the low carbon 
growth model and this must be projected externally to ensure meaningful advancement 
internationally. 
(3) Non state actors and local authorities 
This programme is one of the few "actor-oriented" thematic programmes, giving a wide range of 
civil society actors and local authorities the exclusive opportunity (right of initiative) to propose 
actions and promoting an inclusive and empowered local society. The actions implemented do 
not necessarily have the backing of the host country government. 
The Mid-Term Review recognises that "a nucleus of high quality projects have been funded 
under all three programme objectives to date". The Court of Auditors report on NSA and 
development recognises that "projects implemented by NSAs are relevant and are likely to 
produce the intended results".  
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With regard to "Development Education and Awareness Raising in Europe" (the second objective 
of this programme), it is worth underlining that this programme is unique insofar as it is the only 
one in Europe that supports actions aimed at convincing Europeans about the purpose of our 
development efforts.  
With regard to local authorities, their particular role in the context of development is recognised 
in the Communication from the Commission to the Council regarding local authorities. 
(4) Food security 
The objective of the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) is to improve food security for 
the poorest and vulnerable, and more broadly, to contribute to achieving MDG1 (on poverty and 
hunger). Over time, the FSTP and agricultural research for development has been performing 
better, partners are stronger, governance and networks are being strengthened, and standards and 
tools are being shared by donors, implementing partners and recipient countries. The enhanced 
involvement of local civil society organisations has helped to better respond to local needs in 
Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) contexts. The programme intervenes 
successfully in crisis and post-crisis situations, allowing for flexibility in linking humanitarian 
and development operations. The Mid-Term review of the FSTP recognised the relevance of the 
interventions financed by the FSTP and recommended maintaining the orientations, while 
streamlining it in fewer areas. 
(5) Migration 
The migration and asylum programme's main objective is to support third countries in their 
efforts to ensure better management of migratory flows. The programme covers the following 
five major fields of action: (a) fostering the links between migration and development, (b) 
promoting well-managed labour migration, (c) preventing and curbing irregular immigration and 
facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants, (d) protecting migrants against exploitation and 
exclusion, (e) promoting asylum and international protection. 
An external evaluation of the programme was conducted between October 2009 and February 
2010. Its assessment was positive and it highlighted the high quality of the technical assistance 
and capacity building provided through the projects. 
This thematic programme enjoys significant flexibility and scope of action. Above all, it allows 
for an increased integration of migration and asylum issues in development policies, matching the 
EU's political priorities with third countries' needs. The programme also stimulates the 
coordination between actions in third countries funded through external instruments and actions 
funded under Member States' national programmes. 
B) Areas for improvement 
The geographical programmes 
The current DCI objective is to focus on poverty eradication (MDGs) in the context of 
sustainable development, while also promoting human rights, democracy, good governance and 
the specific objectives of the region. This objective should be reformulated to highlight a more 
comprehensive view of poverty, i.e. supporting reform and modernization efforts in developing 
countries which contribute to building inclusive and cohesive societies and reducing social 
exclusion and poverty and protecting the natural resource base on which economic growth 
depends while ensuring that growth respects the environmental limits of the planet. 
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The DCI covers a wide range of countries falling under the OECD DAC definition of developing 
countries, from the LDCs to upper middle income countries. Given the very different 
development needs, performance and interests of each type of country, including in fragile states, 
the DCI does not allow sufficient differentiation between the partners. The rise of several 
developing partners, the economic and social disparities amongst the partner countries and the 
development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance call for an enhanced 
flexibility in terms of objectives and cooperation modalities within the DCI. 
Under the present DCI there is no specific chapter, nor measures on fragile states or countries in 
crisis, although there is a formal link with the Instrument for Stability (IfS). However, this link 
has created unjustified expectations that any action supported under the IfS will continue, by 
default, to be supported under the DCI. Addressing transition challenges requires a set of 
responses at country level, based on specific needs and related to a common strategy (holistic 
approach). The EU needs to foster coordination and complementarity between the different 
instruments and between donors. This effort should be based on a joint framework with a 
common analysis of the challenges to be addressed. It should aim to improve the links between 
the various levels of intervention, the different policies involved to be defined and the 
programming priorities. 
The intention to concentrate DCI cooperation strategically has only partially worked. In general, 
our development cooperation remains fragmented and over-ambitious. 
The thematic programmes 
For the thematic instruments in general, the following improvements should be considered: 
– improving coherence between actions supported by geographical and thematic 
programmes; 
– reducing the number of small actions resulting in ad hoc interventions and in a 
disproportionate implementation workload; 
– some thematic programmes should be treated within the country bilateral envelope of 
EU assistance. 
– more support should be granted in synergy with the other EU policies and internal 
instruments (e.g. support for research and innovation capacity building to facilitate 
uptake of the EU research and innovation framework programme Horizon 2020). The 
same is valid for other policies and their funding instruments to ensure coherence and 
complementarity. 
The issues for improvement more specific for each thematic instrument are: 
1. Investing in people:  
The area covered by the thematic programme "Investing in people" represents a high number of 
themes (and budget lines). The difficulty in programming and managing such a large number of 
possible actions is exacerbated by the implementation modalities chosen. A high number of calls 
for proposals with relatively small allocations may create frustration among applicants. 
The resulting perception that whatever cannot be financed elsewhere can be financed under the 
"Investing in people" programme, favouring the birth of pilot budget lines, is adding technical 
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and operational difficulties to the management of the human and social development area. 
Investment in the capacity to engage in research and innovation and use it, is particularly relevant 
here. 
2. ENRTP: 
Because of the wide coverage (biodiversity, climate change, desertification, forests, hazardous 
substances, sustainable consumption and production, energy, environmental governance etc.) it 
has not always been possible to have clear priorities.  
EU visibility is relatively weak as no promotion budget is foreseen.  
Actions under the programme are identified through a wide range of channels (calls for proposals 
EU initiatives, direct discussions with international organisations and partner countries). 
Implementation modalities are diverse and cover the whole range of possibilities (grant contracts, 
contribution agreements, financing agreements, contributions to trust and equity funds, delegated 
cooperation), offering added value to supporting policy-oriented initiatives in areas which are 
politically exposed and changing rapidly (FLEGT, climate change, in particular). To manage this 
diversity is a challenge.  
In turn, achieving these objectives requires support for research and innovation capacity building. 
3. Non state actors and local authorities: 
The Court of Auditors76 has noted a potentially disruptive side effect of the call for proposals 
procedure, contradicting such objectives as (i) “engaging civil society organisations of the South” 
and (ii) “capacity building”. Indeed, project proposals submitted by "stronger" organisations 
stand a much higher chance of being selected, while as a result, "weaker" organisations are 
increasingly left without being able to prove their capabilities. 
4. Food security: 
The programme is fragmented into many sub-components and projects. The Mid-Term review of 
the FSTP recognised the relevance of the interventions financed by the FSTP and recommended 
maintaining the orientations, while streamlining it in fewer areas. 
The following strategic challenges are being addressed: 
– the articulation with food security support funded by geographic instruments must be 
ensured while some flexibility needs to be maintained for financing as a follow up to 
crisis situations (linking relief to rehabilitation and development) and in cases where 
geographical instruments can not operate; 
– the ability of the instrument to react to crisis situations is limited by the scope of the 
programme; 
– long term engagement and predictability must be ensured in order to support the 
provision of international public goods, in particular pro-poor demand driven research 
and innovation; 
– the involvement of civil society (including farmers' organisations) in food security 
governance; 
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– coordination, linkages with development (notably tools such as rural micro-finance), and 
regional approaches could be improved. Nutritional issues have been overlooked and 
private sector development has been neglected. Similarly, local authorities, a new 
partner for food security, are not supported sufficiently; 
– a "Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework" was designed in the context of the 
"FSTP" decision C/2010/9263. It will now be tested in about 12 countries. The aim is to 
improve coordination with humanitarian and geographical instruments, together with 
other donor assistance. The joint LRRD framework will remain the base for action, and 
short and medium term activities will be identified to guarantee food security for the 
poorest and most vulnerable.  
5. Migration 
Because of its flexibility, the programme finances innovative and pilot actions that can serve as 
examples for further and more elaborate initiatives. Nevertheless, the thematic programme 
should: (a) better involve governments from third countries as active stakeholders; (b) provide 
more support to local civil society organisations and local authorities, and (c) ensure that the 
highest political level both in Europe and third country governments is fully informed of the 
projects being implemented, so as to increase the Programme's visibility and facilitate political 
dialogue. 
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Annex IV 
Bibliography 
Reports covering the geographic/thematic areas of the DCI, supporting evidence to the 
Impact Assessment 
 TITLE DATE OF 
PUBLICATION 
 
1 Evaluations  
 
1.1 Country/Region Evaluations  
 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation and partnership with the 
People's Republic of China – Country level evaluation 
April 2007 
 Evaluación de la cooperación regional de la CE en América Central Julio de 2007 
 Evaluation de la coopération de la Commission européenne avec la Bolivie Juillet 2007 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic of India August 2007 
 Evaluation of the Commission's support to Southern African Development 
Community – SADC – Regional level evaluation 
October 2007 
 Evaluation of the Commission's support to the Region of Eastern and Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean – Regional level evaluation 
December 2008 
 Evaluation of EC co-operation with the LAO PDR June 2009 
 Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN June 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation with Malaysia July 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's Cooperation with Vietnam October 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation with Thailand October 2009 
 Evaluation of European Commission's Cooperation with Nicaragua 1998-2008 November 2009 
 Evaluation of European Commission's co-operation with El Salvador – Country 
level evaluation 
March 2010 
 Evaluation of the European Commission’s Co-operation with Maldives November 2010 
 
1.2 Instruments / Sector / Thematic Evaluations  
 
 Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance June 2006 
 Thematic evaluation of the water and sanitation sector July 2006 
 Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries November 2006 
 Evaluation of the Commission Support for Statistics in Third Countries 15/02/2007 
 Evaluation thématique - Développement rural et agricole July 2007 
 Evaluation of EC support to partner countries in the area of energy April 2008 
 General Evaluation of Actions to Raise Public Awareness of Development Issues 
in Europe / Development Education EC 
December 2008 
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 Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention 
and Peace Building – Preliminary study: scoping and mapping. Final Report for 
the Preliminary Study 
July 2009 
 The Five-Year Evaluation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Synthesis of Study Areas 1, 2 and 3. 
March 2009 
 Evaluation of the AENEAS Programme – Financial and technical assistance to 
third countries in the area of migration and asylum 2004-2006 
December 2009 
 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peace Building - Concept Study – Final Report for the Concept Study 
September 2010 
 Qualitative Assessment of EC funded Drugs Related Projects October 2010 
 Thematic global evaluation of EC support to the Education sector in partner 
countries 
December 2010 
 Lessons learned from evaluating EC interventions in the road sector (note ARES) 15/12/2010 
 Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed 
by the Joint Evaluation Unit (draft desk report, vol. 1 & 2) 
January 2011 
 
1.3 Aid modalities Evaluations  
 
 Evaluation of general budget support: synthesis report – A Joint Evaluation of 
General Budget Support 1994-2004 
May 2006 
 Evaluating co-ordination, complementarity and coherence in EU development 
policy: a synthesis 
November 2007 
 Evaluation of Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through 
the organisations of the UN family 
May 2008 
 Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through Development banks and EIB November 2008 
 Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations December 2008 
 Final report of the Experts Working Group on additionality of grants in the 
framework of blending mechanisms, established following a decision by the 
ECOFIN Council in December 2008 
December 2009 
 Evaluation Methodology & Baseline Study of European Commission Technical 
Cooperation support Inception Report - Final Version 
August 2010 
 
1.4. Programme Evaluations  
 
 Midterm evaluation of the Alfa II 2005 
 Midterm evaluation of EUROsociAL November 2007 
 Midterm evaluation of URB-AL II 2007 
 Final evaluation of AL-INVEST III 2008 
 Final evaluation @lis 2008 
 Evaluation of the BOMCA Programme (Border Management in Central Asia) December 2010 
 Midterm evaluation of the Alfa III 2010 
 Midterm evaluation of the Euro-Solar programme 2010 
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2. Court of Audits Special Reports  
 
 Special report No 6/2006 concerning the environmental aspects of the 
Commission's development cooperation – OJ C 235 
29/09/2006 
 Special report No 6/2007 on the effectiveness of technical assistance in the context 
of capacity development together with the Commission's replies – OJ C 312 
21/12/2007 
 Special report No 6/2008 concerning European Commission Rehabilitation Aid 
following the tsunami and hurricane Mitch 
2008 
 Special report No 4/2009 – The Commission's management of Non-State Actors' 
involvement in EC development cooperation 
2009 
 Special report No 15/2009 – EU assistance implemented through United Nations 
organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
2009 
 Special report No, 11/2010 - Commission's management of General Budget 
Support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries 
2010 
 Special report No. 12/2010 - EU Development Assistance for Basic Education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
2010 
 
3 Internal Audit Service Reports  
 
 IAS-2005-AIDCO/ECHO-001 Implementation of the framework agreement with 
UN agencies 
2005 
 IAS-2006-AIDCO-003 Eligibility of Costs under the Financial and Administrative 
Framework Agreement with the United Nations by DG AIDCO 
2006 
 AIDCO-2006-AIDCO/DEV-003 Audit on Budget Support – Pool Funds and Trust 
Funds 
2006 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-001 Audit on NGO's funding by DG AIDCO – Fup1 2007 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-002 Financial Management of main programmes within 
Directorate D 
2007 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-003 Financial Management of Regional Programmes 2007 
 IAS.B-2008-AIDCO-002 Financial Management of main programmes within 
Directorate B 
2008 
 IAS.B-2008-AIDCO/ECHO-001 Follow up of the FAFA implementation with UN 
in DGs AIDCO and ECHO 
2008 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-004 Follow-up of Eligibility of Costs under FAFA with UN 2009 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-003 Second Follow-up of Audit in NGO Funding by DG 
AIDCO 
2009 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-005 Audit on Thematic Budget lines 2009 
 IAS.B5-2010-AIDCO-001 Audit on Programmes Estimates financed by EU and 
EDF Budget 
2010 
 
4 Internal Audit Capability Reports  
 
 Budget Support, pool and trust funds 2007 
 Budget Support Conditionality 2008 
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 Audit Report on Food Facility 2010 
 Audit Report on Aid Implementation under Crisis Situation 2010 
 
5 Synthesis based on Result Oriented Monitoring Reports  
 
 Causes underlying Effectiveness and Impact of EC Development Projects – 
Qualitative study based on ongoing and ex post ROM reports (2005-2007)  
May 2009 
 Executive Summary (internal): Towards a better use of ROM and project 
evaluations 
September 2010 
 
6 Mid-Term/End-Term Review of Financial Instruments  
 
 AIDCO contribution to Mid-Term Review of RELEX financial instruments, 
collection of status per instrument (note AIDCO/01 Adonis No 13280) 
16/06/2008 
 Mid-term review of the financial instruments for external actions (COM(2009) 196 
- Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) 
21/04/2009 
 Report evaluating the implementation of the financial instruments for external 
actions (SEC (2009) 530 - Commission Staff working document accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council on the mid-term 
review of the financial instruments for external actions) 
21/04/2009 
 Food Facility: Interim report on Measures Taken (SEC 2010(245) - 
Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) 
March 2010 
 Minutes of the 3 meetings of internal working group (AIDCO, ELARG, ECFIN, 
DEV and RELEX) in charge of analysing the governance structure of the existing 
loan-grant blending mechanisms in the external assistance field, held internally and 
with the main European Finance Institutions 
April and May 2010 
 
7 Mid-Term Reviews of Thematic Strategy Papers  
 
 Food Security Thematic Programme mid-term review (2007-2009) September 2009 
 Mid-Term Review of the thematic programme NSA/LA December 2009 
 Review of the ENRTP (Environment and sustainable management of natural 
resources, including energy) 
December 2009 
 Mid-Term Review on the Thematic Programme Migration and Asylum March 2010 
 Investing in people – Mid-term Review of Strategy Paper for Thematic Programme 
(2007 – 2013) 
November 2010 
 
8 Mid-Term Reviews of Country/Region Strategy Papers  
 
 iQSG Progress Report on second-generation Country Strategy Papers 2007/8-2013 
(SEC(2009) 431 - Commission Staff working document) 
30/03/2009 
 State of play of EU joint programming of external assistance – desk study of recent 
experiences 
09/12/2010 
 Strategy Papers – Chapter on Lessons learnt: 
South Africa 
Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
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Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Vietnam, , Yemen, Regional Central Asian Countries 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Regional Latin America, Regional Central 
America, Regional Comunidad Andina, Regional Mercosur 
 
9 External Reviews  
 
 IEG Review of World Bank - Engaging with Fragile States - Support to Low-
Income Countries Under Stress 
2006 
 OECD/DAC Peer review of the European Commission 2007 
 Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) Annual 
MOPAN Survey 2008 
2008 
 IMF - Emerging from the Global Crisis: Macroeconomic Challenges Facing Low-
Income Countries  
October 2010 
 
